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Abstract
Through the algorithmic filtering (AF) of content, social media platforms (SMPs)
have the ability to influence users’ perceptions and behaviors. Attempts to regulate
the negative side effects of AF are often difficult to pass or enforce due to critical
social, legal, and financial considerations. In this work, we address this multifaceted
problem by proposing a unifying framework that considers the key stakeholders of
AF regulation (or self-regulation). We mathematically formalize this framework,
using it to construct a data-driven, statistically sound regulatory procedure that
satisfies several important criteria. First, by design, it moderates the effect of AF on
user learning. Second, it has desirable properties of online governance, including
being normative and user-driven. Third, by illustrating the regulatory procedure in
linear dynamical systems, we prove that it can align social and financial interests,
which are typically at odds. Specifically, we identify conditions under which the
regulation imposes a low cost on the SMP’s reward (e.g., profits) and incentivizes
the SMP to increase content diversity. We provide illustrative simulations.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of people turn to social media platforms (SMPs) as their information providers,
with content coming from friends, celebrities, news outlets, influencers, advertisers, and more. Faced
with a sea of information, users can only ingest so much content. In response, SMPs algorithmically
select, or filter, the collection of content that appears on a user’s feed.
Algorithmic filtering (AF) [14, 27] has the potential to greatly improve the user experience, but it
can also yield unwanted side effects, like the spread of fake news [52, 18, 21], over-representation
of polarizing opinions due to comment ranking [69], amplification of filter bubbles [32, 59], or
advertising of products based on discriminatory judgments about user interests [71, 74, 46]. The
increasing regularity of these phenomena have led to rising legal and public scrutiny of SMPs.
While many works handle these issues separately, we observe that they share the same root concern.
Namely, that filtering users’ feeds affects what users learn and therefore how they act. Pervasive
fake news can affect voting outcomes, polarizing comments can cause ill will between groups,
discriminatory housing ads can lead to digital redlining, video recommendations can change a user’s
dietary choices, and so on. As SMPs become increasingly popular, the question remains: Is there a
principled way to regulate the effect of AF on user learning?
Although it may be possible to do so, such a regulatory procedure must also be practical. In particular,
there are various legal and social barriers to regulations [49, 16, 7, 58], including concerns that they
might damage free speech or public discourse; violate personal rights or privacy; allow big tech or
the government to draw highly subjective lines determining “acceptable” behavior; or set dangerous
precedents. Moreover, social media has created a thriving exchange of goods between users, SMPs,
advertisers, and influencers [2, 53]. Fears that a regulation might disrupt this market would stall or
block its adoption, especially when most SMPs are currently self-regulated [49]. As such, regulation
design must be mindful of the social, legal, and financial perspectives that may be in tension.
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FOUR STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION:
REGULATION DESIDERATA:
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Figure 1: Unifying framework for AF regulation: key stakeholders and desiderata (Section 2).
Motivated by these views, we propose a regulation that provably mitigates the effect of AF on user
learning while meeting key social, legal, and financial criteria. Our main contributions are as follows.
Unifying framework for AF regulation. In Section 2, we study the four main stakeholders of AF
regulation and present a set of regulation desiderata. Together, they prescribe that a regulation not
only address the negative social outcomes of AF, but also be practical and enforceable.
Principled regulatory procedure. In Section 3, we mathematically formalize this framework and
construct a regulatory procedure. The procedure uses hypothesis testing to detect learning divergence
for a given user and notably does not require knowledge of the user’s learning behavior. By design, the
data-driven regulation provably mitigates the effect of AF on user learning and meets two of the four
regulation desiderata from Section 2. Our approach has parallels with social learning [25, 5, 1, 54] ,
differential privacy [29, 30], and robust optimization [8, 80].
Regulation can align social and financial interests. In Section 4, we illustrate our regulation in
linear dynamical systems and show that, under mild conditions, it meets the four regulation desiderata
simultaneously. In particular, we derive conditions under which the regulation places little to no
financial cost on the SMP while incentivizing the SMP to increase the user’s content diversity.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that provides a theoretical analysis of AF’s effect on user
learning and, moreover, shows there exists a regulation aligning social, legal, and financial interests.
2 Unifying framework
In this section, we present a framework for studying the social, legal, and financial ramifications of
AF regulation by considering four key stakeholders. Specifically, we explore the social perspective,
which seeks to mitigate the negative side effects of AF on user learning; the financial perspective,
which seeks to preserve the market created by SMPs; the regulator’s perspective, which seeks to
ensure that regulation is enforceable and long-lasting; and the user’s perspective, which seeks to
improve the user experience. The next four subsections examine one stakeholder at a time. Together,
these discussions motivate four desiderata for AF regulation, which prescribe that regulation be:
1. Context-dependent: adapt to different legal and social norms, platform-user interactions, etc.
2. User-driven: require that systematic changes to a user’s content be based on that user’s input.
3. Low-cost: allow (near) optimal operation, according to some reward function (e.g., profits).
4. Diversity-inducing: encourage the curation of more diverse content in a user’s feed.
One important conclusion is that, although the stakeholder perspectives may seem in tension with one
another, any regulation satisfying these properties collectively alleviate the social, legal, and financial
concerns of all four stakeholders. In Sections 3-4, we formalize a regulatory procedure, showing that
it is possible to achieve all four desiderata simultaneously. This section is summarized in Fig. 1.
2.1 Stakeholder #1: the user’s perspective
From the user’s perspective, the SMP should provide content that is user-driven. This notion has
two implications. First, that the user has say in the content she is shown with her input eliciting an
appropriate response. Second, that the user is presented with diverse content, thereby allowing her to
choose the items (e.g., ads, articles) with which she would like to engage. For example, a single click
(e.g., a like) should not cause a large distribution shift or sudden concentration of similar content.
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To design a user-driven AF regulation, we introduce the notion of consent. We refer to consent not in
terms of the sharing of private information, but in terms of a user’s control over the service she is
being provided (e.g., over her own feed or ads [60]). For example, consent may be given through
indicators, such as friending, following, liking, or agreeing to ads. A consent-based regulation (CBR)
then examines how the SMP deviates from the consumer-provider relationship to which the user
agreed to enter. In this way, a CBR gives each user more agency over her feed. It also provides a
natural alternative to brittle, one-size-fits-all regulations, making it more flexible and long-lasting
(see Section 2.2). Note that a CBR does not restrict feeds to containing only content that has received
consent. Rather, it uses consent as a guideline (see Section 2.2), and we later prove that our CBR
incentivizes greater content diversity. Determining precisely what qualifies as consent is important
but beyond the scope of this work, and discussions on the topic can be found in [64, 60, 40].
2.2 Stakeholder #2: the regulator’s perspective
From the regulator’s perspective, a regulation should be: (1) consistent with the relevant social and
legal norms; (2) enforceable; and (3) adaptable in that it should remain appropriate, even under
changing circumstances. We claim it is sufficient to require that the regulation is natural, as follows.
All regulations must ultimately draw a line, on one side of which the regulated behavior is penalized.
Two difficult questions arise: (a) Where should the line be drawn, and (b) Who makes this decision?
For (a), one naïve option is to draw the line globally (e.g., articles with more than X false statements
are labeled unreliable). However, this one-size-fits-all approach is highly subjective, brittle (i.e.,
does not adapt well), and easily subject to adversarial hacks. For this reason, regulations that are
context-dependent are more effective (e.g., why did Facebook show this ad to certain users but not
others, and is this consistent with our social values and legal norms?). For (b), one option is the
SMP. However, this creates a conflict of interest and sets dangerous precedents (e.g., further extends
the reach of big tech). Another option is a set of experts, which removes the conflict of interest and
provides a well-informed decision. A third option is the user; as detailed in Section 2.1, CBRs have
many benefits, including empowering the user and aligning the regulation with user preferences.
We combine the latter two options to create what we term a natural reference: the dimension along
which the line is drawn is based on user consent (see Section 2.1), and the line’s location along this
dimension is determined by domain experts. In addition to being user-driven, a natural regulation is
also context-dependent, meaning that judgments about the regulated behavior depend on legal and
social norms, and decisions are made on a platform- and user-basis. As such, natural regulations have
desirable properties of online governance, including being user-driven, normative, and adaptable.
2.3 Stakeholder #3: the market perspective
From the market perspective, a regulation should not place undue financial burdens on the involved
parties. In particular, it should allow SMPs to retain revenue sources so that they can continue to
provide their services; users to access the goods (e.g., information, connections, recommendations)
that they expect on the SMP; and advertisers to maintain exposure to potential customers.
We claim that such regulations must meet three criteria. First, one traditionally expects a tension
between the social and market perspectives in the form of a regulation-reward tradeoff. However,
such a tradeoff does not necessarily exist. It is indeed possible that there are multiple (near) “optimal”
solutions—measured according to some objective function, such as profits or number of clicks—and
not all are prohibited by the regulation. In these situations, it is possible for the regulation to guide
the SMP to alternate (near) optimal solutions. Such regulations are low-cost. Additionally, low-cost
regulations can preserve the advertiser-consumer market by being user-driven and diversity-inducing.
These properties allows users to indicate the goods they are interested in from a sufficiently diverse
set of choices, which also gives advertisers better exposure and understanding of the user’s interests.
2.4 Stakeholder #4: the social perspective
We conclude with the primary motivation of this work: mitigating the negative side effects of AF. In
this section, we observe that many of the side effects are instances of information misrepresentation
(see Fig. 2), which can be addressed by increasing content diversity relative to an appropriate baseline.
There are primarily two mechanisms by which SMPs shape information. One is algorithmic filtering
(AF) [14], which is the selection of the content shown to a user, performed by the SMP to maximize
revenue or user engagement. Another is the filter bubble (FB) [59], which is a state of information
isolation that occurs when a user is primarily shown content reinforcing her current beliefs. This
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Algorithmic content filtering & filter bubbles
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comments in a post’s comment preview. 
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Content provides information. Information affects user’s beliefs. Beliefs affect user’s behaviors.MOTIVATION:
Increasing content diversity relative to natural reference alleviates information misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation of truth Misrepresentation of opportunitiesMisrepresentation of consensus
Figure 2: Social perspective: the effects of information misrepresentation on users (Section 2.4).
work focuses on AF for two reasons: it requires algorithmic design, which allows it to be regulated,
and AF can also be used to mitigate FBs. AF is closely related to popular machine learning topics,
including personalization algorithms [14] and recommender systems [50].
As detailed in Section 1, a wide range of issues can be traced to the same root concern that SMPs
influence user learning and behavior through information filtering. In fact, we propose that many
of the problematic outcomes on social media are instances of information misrepresentation (IM),
which is illustrated via examples in Fig. 2. Motivated by this unifying perspective, we focus on
addressing IM and make the following observation about its relationship to content diversity.
Key observation: Information misrepresentation is alleviated by increasing content diversity relative
to a natural reference. Intuitively, IM occurs when content is “biased” with respect to some reference
and can be alleviated by increasing content diversity. However, choosing an appropriate reference
against which to increase content diversity remains opaque. We propose that such a reference must be
natural. As defined in Section 2.2, natural references are advantageous because they are user-driven,
normative, and adaptable. Using a natural reference, content is considered locally biased (e.g., with
respect to the user, platform, and relevant norms) when it deviates significantly in distribution from
the content to which that user has consented. Critically, one compares distributions rather than
specific parameters, which is important because distributions capture uncertainty. This nuance is
key because uncertainty plays large role in decision-making (e.g., FBs are problematic because they
convey certain opinions with high certainty). For a more details, see Appendix B.
Example: Suppose female user X joins an SMP and, without regulation, the ads shown to X would
favor beauty products. Increasing ad diversity gives X more options and ensures that the ads are not
based on unjustified inferences. If, even with diverse options, X mostly clicks on ads relating to
beauty, then the natural distribution of X shifts to favor these products, and showing X more beauty
products in the future would not be a violation of regulation. However, if X only clicks on ads relating
to books but the SMP continues to increase the proportion of (i.e., narrow the distribution around)
beauty ads, then the regulation is violated. Note that presenting X with diverse options from which
the SMP learns X’s interests also improves X’s user experience and better matches ads to the user.
Increasing content diversity relative to an appropriate reference has precedence in the literature and
lies at the heart of many efforts to remedy bias, misinformation, FBs, and more [14, 15, 81, 76]. Note
that our work focuses on AF and not, for example, detecting fake news [68] or hate speech [23].
3 Formalizing regulation
In this section, we formalize the framework in Section 2 and use it to construct a context-dependent
and user-driven regulatory procedure that provably mitigates the effect of AF on user learning.
3.1 Setup
Consider a specific user and SMP. Let P = {pz(·;θ) : θ ∈ Θ} and the user’s feed at time t ≥ 0 be
represented by Z(t) ∼ pz(·;θ(t)), where Z(t) = {z(t)1 , . . . , z(t)m }, z(t)i correspond to individual pieces
of content, and θ(t) is latent to the user. In the static or time-invariant setting, θ(t+1) = θ(t) for all t.
As the user browses through her feed, she implicitly forms a belief qz(·|Z(t)) based on her obser-
vations Z(t). Suppose that qz(·|Z(t)) ∈ P such that qz(·|Z(t)) = pz(·; θ˜(t)). In other words, θ˜(t)
parameterizes the user’s belief at time t. Let the estimator A(t) represent the user’s learning behavior
such that θ˜(t+1) = A(t)(Z(t), θ˜(t)). For notational clarity, we omit the time index t until Section 3.
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3.2 Learning divergence
Recall that a natural reference is a benchmark derived from consent (see Section 2.1). Let ZF denote
the user’s filtered feed and ZN denote what would have been her natural feed, where |ZN | = |ZF | =
m. Let the generative models that produced these feeds be denoted by θN ,θF ∈ Θ, respectively.
As discussed above, the user implicitly learns a model from her feed. With enough evidence, the user
gains confidence in her model, using it to make decisions. Both the learned model and the user’s
confidence in it are captured by the belief parameters θ˜. Therefore, determining the impact of AF on
user learning and decision-making is a matter of comparing the learning outcomes θ˜N and θ˜F .
This impact can be formalized using hypothesis testing [26]. Let there be two hypotheses. The null
hypothesis H0 : θN = θF corresponds to the decision that the user’s beliefs under natural and filtered
feeds are sufficiently similar. The alternative hypothesis is H1 : θN 6= θF . Then, rejecting the null
hypothesis with high confidence implies that AF causes significantly different learning outcomes,
which we term learning divergence. The goal of regulation is to mitigate learning divergence.
3.3 Regulatory procedure
We now construct a data-driven regulatory procedure that moderates learning divergence. Since
learning divergence is measured with respect to a natural reference, the regulation is both user-driven
and context-dependent by construction, thereby satisfying two of the desiderata from Section 2.
The framework for detecting learning divergence in Section 3.2 depends on the user’s learning
behavior A, which may be unknown. The following result shows that the regulator can prevent
learning divergence without knowledge of A. Specifically, it specifies a way to detect learning
divergence regardless of A using the well-known uniformly most powerful (UMP) hypothesis test.
Lemma 1 ([36], Theorem 1). Consider a one-sided binary composite hypothesis test of H0 : w ∼
pw(·; η), η ≤ ηb against H1 : w ∼ pw(·; η), η > ηb, where ηb is known. Let Ω0 = {η : η ≤ ηb},
Ω1 = {η : η > ηb}, and Ω = Ω0 ∪ Ω1. Let  the allowable false positive rate. If the uniformly most
powerful (UMP) test exists, then it is defined by the following decision rule: reject H0 when the
MVUE of η ∈ Ω, denoted by η˜+, satisfies η˜+ > η, where P (η˜+ > η|H = H0) = .
In words, designing the regulation to prevent learning divergence for a user whose learning is given
by the MVUEA+ also ensures that it simultaneously prevents learning divergence for all other users.
In our setting, η = d(θF ,θN) and H0 : d(θF ,θN) = 0. Motivated by this result, the regulator need
only consider the MVUE A+ rather than enumerating through all possible users and deducing their
learning behaviors, which may be costly or infeasible.
Thus, the regulatory procedure is as follows. The regulator applies the MVUE to ZN and ZF , to obtain
the estimates θ˜+N and θ˜
+
F . These estimates are used to decide whether to reject the null hypothesis H0
(i.e., choose H1). Let the regulator’s decision be denoted as H˜ ∈ {H0, H1}. Then, we let H˜ = H1
when the learning outcomes θ˜+N and θ˜
+
F are sufficiently different as measured by a distance metric
d(·, ·), and H˜ = H0 otherwise. As such, learning divergence can be formalized as follows.
Definition 1 (-rejection). Given  ∈ (0, 1), the regulator decides H˜ = H1 when d(θ˜+N , θ˜+F ) > δ,
where δ > 0 is chosen so that P(H˜ = H1|H0) = , and H˜ = H0 otherwise. This rule detects
learning divergence with (1− ) confidence.
The goal of regulation is to reduce the occurrence of learning divergence, as follows.
Definition 2 ((α, )-regulation). For α,  ∈ (0, 1), the regulator requires that -rejection occur with
frequency no more than α.
α and  control the strictness of regulation and, as discussed in Section 2.2, are determined by domain
experts. Intuitively, α represents the allowance the regulator gives to the SMP, and  represents the
maximum false positive rate the regulator is willing to accept when deciding to investigate the SMP
for a regulation violation. As such, the regulator wishes to keep  small. In some cases, it may
be difficult to solve P(d(θ˜+N , θ˜
+
F ) > δ|H0) =  in Definition 1 with equality. In this scenario, the
regulator can upper bound the left-hand side, then solve for equality, which still ensures that the false
positive rate is at most . A pseudocode-style description of the regulation is included in Appendix C.
We also defer several procedural details (e.g., access ZN and ZF , definition of features z) to Appendix
C, noting that these issues do not prevent the proposed procedure from being operationalized.
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It is worth a remark that our analysis has parallels with the field of differential privacy (DP) [29, 30],
which explores how to protect individual privacy while preserving group-level trends in datasets
by, similarly to our work, comparing distributions under various interventions [78]. However, it
differs in several key ways, including: (1) the masking of attributes of individual units (e.g., posts)
are not critical in AF regulation whereas they are central to DP; (2) operationally, the SMP selects
from an existing collection of content and cannot add noise to a piece of content, which is the
primary mechanism of DP; and (3) the difference in settings elicits an entirely new set of questions,
stakeholders, tradeoffs, and metrics that require a separate, tailored analysis.
3.4 Cost of Regulation
In this section, we turn from the regulator’s perspective to the SMP’s perspective. Under a given
(α, )-regulation, the SMP avoids receiving a penalty by performing hypothesis matching, as follows.
Definition 3 ((α, )-matching). The SMP ensures with (1− α)-confidence that -rejection does not
occur by choosing θF relative to θN such that d(θ˜
+
N , θ˜
+
F ) > δ with frequency no more than α.
Intuitively, the easier it is for the user to learn the generative model with high certainty, the more
similar θF and θN must be to meet regulation. For generality, suppose that the generative model
parameters θF and θN are determined by hyperparameters φF and φN such that θF = h(φF )
and θN = h(φN) for some deterministic function h(·). Let Φ = (m,φN ,φF ) be the full set of
hyperparameters. The SMP’s objective is to maximize its reward R (e.g., profits, accuracy) while
meeting regulation by performing (α, )-matching as follows:
max
φF
R (Φ) such that P
(
d
(
θ˜F , θ˜N
)
> δ
∣∣Φ) < α. (1)
This can be viewed as robust optimization [8, 80] and, depending upon the constraint and reward
function, computationally simple or challenging. In this work, we study how regulation affects the
SMP’s cost, as defined next. Let φ∗F be the solution to (1) and Φ
∗ = (m,φN ,φ
∗
F ).
Definition 4 (Feasible set). The feasible set is defined as the set of values for φF given m and φN
such that the regulatory constraint in (1) is satisfied.
Definition 5 (Cost of regulation). The cost of regulation is defined as the difference between the
maximum rewards with and without regulation:
(
maxφF R(Φ)
)−R(Φ∗).
Intuitively, a low cost of regulation is desirable and arises when the feasible set is sufficiently large.
Definition 5 mirrors the “price” of robustness or fairness studied in other works [10, 9].
3.5 Content diversity
Lastly, by the observation in Section 2.4, measuring content diversity is vital to alleviating information
misrepresentation, motivating this final definition.
Definition 6 (Content diversity). The diversity of a feed Z is given by its information entropy [38].
4 Illustrating effects of the proposed regulation
In Section 3, we constructed a regulation that satisfies two of the four regulation desiderata. In this
section, we illustrate our regulatory procedure by applying it to the linear dynamical systems setting
and prove that it is possible to satisfy all four desiderata simultaneously. Our main findings are:
• The cost of regulation is generally high when the user can learn θN and θF with high certainty.
• Impossibility result: In time-invariant analysis, the filtered content must have (nearly) identical
distributional characteristics to those of the natural content in order to meet regulation in the long
term. This implies that the cost of regulation can be high in the time-invariant case.
• Positive result: In the more realistic time-varying analysis, there are conditions under which the
cost of regulation is low or even zero. Furthermore, in these settings, the regulation actually
incentivizes the SMP to increase content diversity in order to maximize its reward.
The positive result implies that it is in the SMP’s interest to adopt the regulation since doing so allows
them to demonstrate that they are socially responsible while making a small financial sacrifice. It also
implies that the regulation aligns social and financial interests. In other words, when the appropriate
conditions hold, there is no regulation-reward tradeoff. Interestingly, recall that the only design goal
of our proposed regulation was to reduce learning divergence. Yet, by doing so with respect to a
natural reference, the proposed regulation also produces desirable social and financial outcomes.
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While the linear dynamical system is simple and utilized here for illustrative purposes, it is represen-
tative of much broader setting, cf. linear approximation via the kernel trick [65] and the universality
of Gaussian distributions [39, 35]. All proofs can be found in Appendix D. To obtain precise results,
we make the following assumption in our analysis.
Assumption 1. The regulator estimates tail probabilities for θ˜+N and θ˜
+
F using finite-sample Gaussian
and sub-Gamma concentration inequalities (the precise forms can be found in Appendix D).
4.1 Time-invariant linear setting: high cost of regulation
In the time-invariant linear setting, the feed Z consists of pieces of content zi = (yi,xi), where:
yi = β
>xi + ui, (2)
each zi corresponds to an individual piece of content with covariates xi ∈ Rr and outcome yi ∈ R
(e.g., yi is the sentiment associated with the topic xi), and ui
i.i.d.∼ N (0, ρ2) is independent of xi. Let
xi,1 = 1 and |xi,k| > 0 for all i ∈ [m] and k ∈ [r]. Let m be the number of items the user has
observed, y = [y1, . . . , ym]> ∈ Rm, X = [x1, . . . ,xm]> ∈ Rm×r be the full-rank (non-random)
design matrix, D = (X>X)−1 ∈ Rr×r, Σ = ρ2Dkk ∈ Rr×r, σ2k = Σkk, and ρ2 > 0. This setting
is time-invariant because the system parameters β ∈ Rr and ρ ∈ R are fixed across time.
Recall that the regulation limits learning divergence by requiring that the learning outcomes under
filtered and natural content are sufficiently close with high probability. In the linear setting, the
relationship between x and y that the user implicitly learns is determined by β˜. As such, the user’s
learning outcome is governed by the parameters θ that determine the distribution of β˜. In Appendix
D, we verify that the MVUE gives estimates β˜k ∼ N (βk, σ2k) for k ∈ [r]. Therefore, in the notation
of Section 3, the appropriate parameters in this setting are θ = (β1, . . . , βr, σ21 , . . . , σ
2
r).
Let θN and θ˜N denote the generative model and the MVUE estimates (we omit the “+” superscript)
for the filtered feed ZF , respectively. Let θF and θ˜F be defined analogously for the natural feed ZN .
Finally, recalling that Φ = (m,φN ,φF ), let φN = (βN , DN , ρN) and φF = (βF , DF , ρF ). For the
remaining analysis, let d(a, b) = |a− b|. With slight abuse of notation, let σc0,k := σcN,k + σcF,k and
σ2∨40,k := max(σ
2
0,k, σ
4
0,k). Let K¯ = K if σ
2
0,k > σ
4
0,k and K¯ =
√
K otherwise. Lastly, define:
pK := exp
(
−m− r
4σ2∨40,k
(
σ20,k(K − 1)
K
− 1
))
, SK(κ) := 2(1− pK)
( 
2
) 1
κ
+ 2pK .
Theorem 2. Consider (2) and let γ ∈ [0, α]. Then, under Assumption 1, (α, )-regulation is met if,
for all k ∈ [r], βF,k satisfies:
|βF,k−βN,k| := dβk ≤ sup
{K:K≥1∩γ≥rSK(K)}
√
2σ20,k
(√
1
K
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− pK)
γ/r − 2pK
))
, (3)
and σ2F,k satisfies:
|σ2F,k−σ2N,k| := dσ2k ≤ sup{K:K≥1∩γ≤α−rSK¯(K)}
4σ2∨40,k
m− r
(
1
K
ln
(
2

)
− ln
(
2(1− pK¯)
(α− γ)/r − 2pK¯
))
.
Theorem 2 characterizes the effect of the regulation on the SMP’s feasible set, which upper bounds
the allowable distances dβk and dσ2k . The theorem implies the following impossibility result that
there are no long-term feasible solutions other than trivial ones in the time-invariant linear analysis.
Corollary 3. As m→∞, the feasible set contains only the trivial solutions φF for which θF = θN .
Intuitively, as more samples arrive, the estimates θ˜N , θ˜F improve, making it increasingly easy for
the regulator to detect learning divergence if θN 6= θF , which implies that the cost of regulation is
high. This result shows that the regulation should not be based on a time-invariant analysis for two
reasons. First, time-invariance does not hold true in the real world. Second, one can draw incorrect
conclusions from this less realistic analysis: namely, that regulation imposes a high cost on the SMP.
Note that the bounds in (3) are of the same order as those expected of the MVUE estimate β˜k, for
which the distance decays as 1/
√
m. In addition, although we use the L1 norm, our approach is
agnostic to the precise definition of d as long as d is a valid distance metric (see Appendix C).
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4.2 Cost and content diversity in time-varying linear setting
In this section, we study the more realistic, time-varying setting. Instead of (2), suppose that:
β(t) = Aβ(t−1) + v(t), y = X(t)β(t) + u(t), (4)
where v(t) ∼ N (0, Q) and u(t) ∼ N (0, ρ2Im) are independent white processes [3]. Similarly to
the time-invariant setting, we show in Appendix C that the MVUE estimates β˜(t)k are Gaussian. We
therefore adopt the same conventions as those in Section 4.1 with two differences. First, σ2t,k = Pt,kk,
where Pt = P¯t − P¯tX>t (XtP¯tX>t + ρ2Im)−1XtP¯t and P¯t = APt−1A> + Q (the time index is
temporarily moved to the subscript). Second, φ(t) = (β(t), D(t), ρ,Q). Note that A is exogeneous.
To contrast the time-varying analysis against the time-invariant one, we show that, even under a very
strict version of the regulation, the feasible set for the SMP is non-trivial. To do so, we adapt Theorem
2 to the time-varying case under a strict version of the regulation (see Appendix D for details).
Corollary 4. Consider (4). Then, under Assumption 1, φ(t)F meets (α, )-regulation for a given m
and φ(t)N as long as φ
(t)
F satisfies (3) with γ = α, σ
2
N,k = σ
2
F,k = P
(t)
N,kk, pK = 0, and K = 1.
We use Corollary 4 to derive the next result, which says that when the world is time-varying (i.e., m
is finite), the feasible set always contains non-trivial solutions, even in the long term.
Proposition 5. If m <∞, there exists Φ(t) that meets regulation such that d(t)βk > 0, even as t→∞.
Intuitively, this occurs because a changing world adds uncertainty, making it less likely for the user to
develop the strong, long-lasting beliefs from a filtered feed that result in learning divergence. Recall
that a large d(t)βk is desirable, because a larger feasible set implies a lower cost of regulation. In fact,
there are conditions under which there is no cost to meeting the regulation, as shown next.
Proposition 6. If the R(Φ) = R(dβ) such that the reward R a strictly concave function of dβ, then,
for every time step t, there exists Φ(t) such that the cost of regulation is arbitrarily small. If, in
addition, R(dβ) has a finite maximum, then there exists Φ(t) for which there is no cost of regulation.
In many cases, R satisfies these conditions. For instance, if R tracks the number of times a user
purchases an advertised product, there is a tradeoff between showing products that are new to the user
(high dβ) and those that are related to the user’s interests (low dβ). Such a relation implies a strictly
concave, finite-maximum R(dβ). Intuitively, the low- (or zero-) cost solution in Proposition 6 exists
when ZN is sufficiently diverse. However, this condition is not strictly necessary, as discussed next.
Lemma 7. Suppose that QN , QF , ρ2N , and ρ2F in (4) are time-varying and latent to the user [20].
Let the reward function R satsify the same conditions as in Proposition 6. Then, at least one
minimum-cost filtered feed Z(t)F,∗ has content diversity that is strictly greater than that of Z
(t)
N .
In other words, there are conditions under which the regulation naturally incentivizes the SMP to the
increase content diversity of Z(t)F relative to Z
(t)
N because doing so increases the SMP’s reward (e.g.,
profit). Since the user interacts with her feed, increasing the content diversity at time t can result in a
more diverse Z(t+1)N , leading to a more diverse Z
(t+1)
F , and so on. The ability of this interplay to bring
about long-term changes (e.g., systematically reducing FBs) is the subject of a future work.
4.3 Interpreting the results
Recall that increasing the size of the feasible set generally decreases the cost of regulation. The
feasible set, cost of regulation, and content diversity are defined in Section 3.
In the time-invariant linear setting of Section 4.1, the results are summarized as follows:
• Meeting regulation restricts the feasible set by upper bounding the distances dβk and dσ2k .• The feasible set grows when the regulator gives the SMP more allowance (higher α) or makes
the definition of learning divergence more strict (lower ).
• The SMP can further lower cost by adding uncertainty (i.e., increasing σ2F,k). Since σ2F,k =
ρ2FDF,kk, adding uncertainty can be done by curating the content to have high noise ρ
2
F relative
to the covariate spread 1/DF,kk (i.e., increasing content diversity).
• There are always many feasible solutions since σ2F,k is a product of two hyperparameters.• By Corollary 3, the long-term cost of regulation is generally high in the time-invariant analysis.
Since time-invariance is unrealistic, this result motivates a time-varying analysis, as follows.
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Figure 3: Illustrating regulation’s effect on user learning, content diversity, and the SMP’s reward.
In the more realistic, time-varying linear setting of Section 4.2, we find that the regulation can be
low-cost and remove the regulation-reward tradeoff. The results are summarized as follows:
• The feasible set is large when α is large,  is small, or the world evolves quickly.
• By Proposition 5, the feasible set always contains non-trivial solutions even in the long term.
• In fact, by Proposition 6, there are conditions under which the cost of regulation is arbitrarily
low or zero. Intuitively, this occurs because regulation places some restrictions but leaves several
degrees of freedom that allow the SMP to find a profitable solution.
• By Lemma 7, there are conditions under which the SMP is naturally incentivized to increase
content diversity in order to lower costs. This result implies that the regulation can serve to align
social and financial interests in contrast to the classical regulation-reward tradeoff.
5 Illustrative examples
We present an experiment summarizing the findings in Section 4.2 (more simulations can be found
in Appendix F). For this section only, we abbreviate ZN to N and ZF to F . Consider (4) with
time-varying Q(t) and ρ(t). To simplify the visualization, suppose r = 1. Fig. 3a visualizes examples
of belief that the MVUE user would learn for β˜(t) based on the SMP’s choice of feed, indicated in the
legend. Then, in Fig. 3b and 3c, we consider two settings. Fig. 3b corresponds to the control setting
with N1, and Fig. 3c corresponds to a more diverse N2 and more quickly varying world. The color
map indicates regulations with different levels of strictness (i.e., α and ) with the scale on the far
right. Each level curve on the color map marks the boundaries of the feasible set for a specific choice
of regulation, where strict regulations only allow choices in the immediate neighborhood of N .
Two key observations follow. First, as they move away from the left, the level curves decrease, then
reach a minimum. As such, the SMP lowers its cost by increasing content diversity subject to the
boundaries imposed by the regulation, showing that the regulation aligns social and financial interests.
Second, the level curves in Fig. 3b and 3c correspond to the same regulations, but their minimums in
Fig 3c are lower and farther right. This verifies that, under the same regulation, reward and diversity
are greater when N is diverse and the user’s learned beliefs have sufficiently high uncertainty. As
discussed below Lemma 7, it is possible for the SMP to realize the second setting in the long term.
6 Conclusion
A large portion of the content on social media is algorithmically filtered by the platform, begging the
question: How does AF affect user learning and decision-making? In this work, we mathematically
formalize this relationship and construct a regulatory procedure that provably mitigates the influence
of AF. We also show that this regulation balances key social, legal, and financial perspectives by
proving that it satisfies four desiderata. In particular, while one might conjecture that there is a tradeoff
between the SMP’s financial reward and content diversity, we show that, under certain conditions, our
proposed regulation aligns the social and financial interests of AF. Our results motivate several paths
for future work. First, we hope to extend our analysis to more general non-linear settings and show
analogous results. Second, we aim to build on the discussion of dynamics at the end of Section 4.2
and draw direct connections between our work and related phenomena, such as FBs and the spread of
fake news. Lastly, we plan to operationalize our procedure using real social media content.
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Broader Impact
The aim of this work is to study the effects of algorithmic content filtering (or curation) in social
media. In light of both the problems and benefits of social media, this work seeks to make two
contributions that may have broader impact. Our primary motivation is to mitigate the negative side
effects of algorithmic filtering (AF) by directly addressing a question at the heart of many issues on
social media. Aware of the difficulties surrounding regulations and their enforcement, our second
aim is to construct a regulation that is anchored by social, legal, and financial considerations with the
intention of designing a regulation that is both beneficial to society as well as practical.
Our hope is that this work can contribute to the ongoing conversations on social media platforms
(SMPs) and provide a potential regulatory framework for AF. The aim is to alleviate various negative
social outcomes (e.g., discriminatory advertising, polarizing comments, spread of fake news) while
appreciating the importance of free speech and public discourse; giving users more control over
their social media experience; avoiding brittle, quick-fix regulatory solutions that may set harmful
precedents; and recognizing the financial benefits of AF for SMPs, influencers, advertisers, etc. As
such, we sought to consider the consequences of our proposed regulation on various stakeholders.
The main stakeholders that may benefit or lose from this work are users, influencers, advertisers, and
SMPs. One of our main focuses in this paper is on the regulation-reward tradeoff, which classically
would benefit users by placing a cost on SMPs, advertisers, and influencers (or vice versa). However,
a main point in our work is to show that one consequence of our regulation is that this tradeoff is not
inevitable. In fact, under the proposed regulation, we specify conditions under which the SMP incurs
little to no cost and that these conditions actually align social and financial interests. As such, our
work should, by design, benefit the user by giving them more agency over their feeds and mitigating
the negative social side effects of AF. If, in addition, the conditions we discuss are also met, then other
involved parties (e.g., the SMP) would incur a low cost under regulation. However, we acknowledge
that unexpected outcomes can occur, and it is possible for the regulation to place a non-negligible
financial cost on the SMPs and advertisers.
Due to the increasing ubiquity of social media, this work touches on many topics, including filter
bubbles, fake news, hate speech, political divisiveness, privacy, and consent, among others. To
the best of our abilities, we attempt to acknowledge and address the issues related to our work by
considering various perspectives of our proposal, explicitly mentioning what problems are within the
scope of this work, providing more detailed discussions in the Supplementary Material, and pointing
to appropriate references. However, there may be angles that we have missed. There is also the
potential to misuse the proposed framework. For instance, if a SMP decided to adopt our procedure
as a self-regulatory measure, the outcome would depend on how seriously the SMP engages in
conversations on consent (one of concepts underpinning our proposal). We choose to not define
consent because its definition is normative (e.g., will depend on the society in which it is enforced).
Another potential misuse would be adversarially designing the features that represent content such
that the regulation is ineffective. However, a good-faith effort to choose and test these features
appropriately should resolve this issue. Lastly, one might be concerned with the use of user feeds to
detect regulation violation, but we believe that simple measures could be taken to protect user privacy.
As discussed in the Supplementary Material, we propose that, with appropriately designed features,
both the user’s identities and the meaning behind the features could be masked since they do not
affect regulation enforcement. Therefore, with carefully laid out but reasonable measures, the user
data would remain private and anonymous.
Our work does not use a training procedure with data. As such, the common forms of bias that appear
in machine learning works are not present. To the best of our knowledge, the only mode by which
“bias” appears in our work is through the notion of consent, as different definitions of consent could
result in different regulatory outcomes. We believe that deciding what qualifies as consent should
reflect the values and norms of the society in which the regulation is enforced. While we briefly
discuss consent in our paper, we assert that it deserves a much more serious conversation involving
social and legal experts that is out of the scope of this work. As a final note, one implicit source of
bias could be in the selection of the model family Θ, which is a decision made by the regulator (i.e.,
we provide a general framework and do not restrict regulation to a specific Θ).
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A Summary of work
Before proceeding, we summarize the objective and main contributions of our work.
Motivation. There are many concerns about the rising influence of social media platforms (SMPs),
such as filter bubbles reinforcing existing beliefs, comment ranking favoring controversial opinions,
fake news shaping political views, housing or employment ads making discriminatory inferences,
or even video recommendations changing a user’s lifestyle. While many works attempt to address
these issues separately, we propose that they share the same root concern: namely that, SMPs are
becoming increasingly popular information sources with the potential to influence user learning and
decision-making. While this effect is not necessarily negative in itself, the unregulated algorithmic
filtering (AF) of content often has negative and avoidable side effects on society, including those
mentioned above. We can therefore alleviate many of the negative outcomes by regulating the effect
of AF on user learning and decision-making. However, such regulatory procedures must be mindful
of important practical considerations, including key social, legal, and financial perspectives, such as
making sure that the regulation respects ethical norms, legal precedents, and financial interests.
Objective of AF regulation. The objective of our work is to design an AF regulation that (1)
alleviates the negative social side effects of AF; (2) addresses nuanced social and political concerns
about regulations; and (3) is both legally and financially practical.
Main contribution. We construct an AF regulation that provably mitigates the effect of AF on user
learning. We show that it satisfies key desirable properties of online governance: namely, that is user-
driven, normative, and adaptable. By demonstrating the regulatory procedure in linear dynamical
systems, we show that there are conditions under which our regulation aligns social and financial
interests and the regulation is low-cost. In contrast to the literature on tradeoffs, we conclude that
there are reasonable conditions under which the regulation meets a set of four desiderata, meaning
that it aligns with key social, legal, and financial perspectives simultaneously.
B Defining important concepts (Sections 2 and 3)
B.1 Review of unifying framework (Section 2)
In Section 2, we provide a unifying framework for AF regulations. We discuss four key stakeholders
of AF regulations. Their perspectives motivate a set of four desiderata for an AF regulation. The
desiderata collectively prescribe that the regulation not only address the negative social side effects of
AF, but also be practical to pass and enforce.
First, recall that the four key stakeholders perspectives are as follows:
1. Social perspective: Regulation should mitigate the negative and avoidable side effects of AF
on society, some of which are listed in Appendix A.
2. Market perspective: Regulation should not disrupt the positive exchange of goods on social
media (e.g., users accessing the information or connections that they seek, advertisers obtaining
exposure to consumers, SMPs maintaining profits to continue providing their services, etc.)
3. Regulator’s perspective: Regulation should be enforceable, adaptable, and long-lasting as
well as consistent with the relevant social and legal norms.
4. User’s perspective: Regulation should maintain or improve the user experience.
Collectively, the stakeholder perspectives motivate four regulation desiderata:
1. Diversity-inducing: Regulation encourages more diverse content (defined and discussed
below). This property addresses the social, market, and user’s perspectives.
2. Low-cost: Regulation allows (near) optimal operation according to a reward function (e.g.,
profits, prediction accuracy). This property addresses the market perspective.
3. Context-dependent: Regulatory decisions depend on context. In particular, the regulation is
framed such that it can adapt to different legal or social norms, types of SMPs, platform-user
interactions, etc. This property addresses the social and regulator’s perspectives.
4. User-driven: Systematic changes to a user’s content under regulation are based on that user’s
input. This property addresses all four stakeholder perspectives.
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This framework is summarized in Fig. 1. Based on this analysis, we construct a regulatory procedure
in Section 3 (resp. Appendix C.2). In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on some of the
concepts introduced in Sections 2 and 3.
B.2 Important definitions & related work
User-driven. Measures that are user-driven imply that choices made on behalf of the user reflect the
user’s preferences. In our setting, this property prescribes that systematic changes made to a user’s
feed are based on that user’s input. From the user’s perspective, the regulation should be user-driven,
which has two implications. The first is that the user’s has say in her content and that her input elicits
an appropriate response. The second is that the user is shown sufficiently diverse content so that
she can choose the items (e.g., ads, articles) with which she would like to engage. In other words,
without diverse content, she would not have the ability to provide the necessary input (as an analogy,
this is similar to the notion of an informed voter). Intuitively, requiring that AF is user-driven should
prevent a single action (e.g., liking a post) from suddenly and significantly changing a user’s feed.
Designing user-driven AF relies on the concept of consent, which is defined next.
The notion of being user-driven is introduced in Section 2.1 and further discussed in Sections 2.2-2.4.
It is shown to be important to all four stakeholder perspectives. By construction, the regulatory
procedure in Section 3 is user-driven because it utilizes a natural reference (defined below).
Consent. In this work, we use consent to derive a natural reference (defined below) such that
the proposed regulation is both user-driven and context-dependent, thereby satisfying two of the
regulation desiderata. As such, consent is an important cornerstone of our regulation. We refer to
consent not in terms of whether parties (e.g., websites or SMPs) have been given permission by users
to share that user’s information, which is a growing privacy concern [70]. Rather, we refer to consent
in terms of the amount of control a user has over the service that she is being provided [60, 40]. In
other words, consent captures the agency a user has over her own feed, advertisements, etc.
As such, a consent-based regulation (CBR) examines how the SMP deviates from the consumer-
provider relationship to which the user agreed. For example, a user may join social media to connect
with friends or receive updates from figures/organizations that she follows. Consent may be given
through indicators, such as friending, following, liking, agreeing to ads, etc. Importantly, CBR does
not require that the SMP only show content to which the user has given consent. Rather, consent
is used as a guideline, as discussed under “natural reference” below. One may worry that utilizing
consent reduces a user’s exposure to diverse content and amplifies filter bubbles, but we prove in our
results that our CBR incentivizes the SMP to increase the content diversity of a user’s feed.
In this way, CBR gives users more agency over their feeds. Moreover, in contrast to regulations that
use one-size-fits-all thresholds (see Section 2.2), CBR also provides a natural baseline against which
to check whether the SMP is behaving appropriately. It is also context-dependent in that the baseline
depends on the specific user-platform interactions as well as the current socio-legal norms on consent.
This property makes CBR flexible and long-lasting. Defining consent is important but beyond the
scope of this work, and thorough discussions on the topic can be found in [64, 60, 40].
Consent is introduced in Section 2.1 and further discussed in Section 2.2.
Regulation enforceability. We now switch focus to the regulator’s perspective. An important
consideration of a regulation is its enforceability. In particular, all regulations much ultimately draw
a line, on one side of which the regulated behavior is penalized. Two difficult questions arise: (a)
Where should the line be drawn, and (b) Who makes this decision? The first question is addressed
under “context-dependent”, and the second under “natural reference”.
Context-dependent. We suggest that one way to address first question (a) is to require that the
regulation is context-dependent, meaning that it is specific to the user and platform as well as
mindful of relevant social and legal norms, as detailed below.
In response to (a), one naïve option is to draw the line globally (e.g., articles with more than
X false statements are labeled unreliable or housing ads that use race to filter its audience are
discriminatory). However, this one-size-fits-all approach is highly subjective, brittle, and easily
subject to adversarial hacks. For example, determining whether an article qualifies as fake is
highly subjective: If the majority of the article is “accurate”, but there is an incorrect statement,
is it fake? Or if the entire article is “accurate”, but several key details regarding the story are
18
omitted, is it fake? A one-size-fits-all rule, including the use of a machine learning algorithm to
judge whether articles qualify as fake, is easily subject to adversarial hacks. Moreover, without
sufficient transparency, such a rule might be accused of stifling free speech and public discourse.
Because of the rapidly changing nature of media, the rule would also be brittle and struggle to
adapt with time. On the other hand, in the absence of algorithms, the daunting task of sifting
through the overwhelming number of news articles may not be possible. Even if one designed
a combined human-algorithm filtering process, it would still fall prey to the concerns about
subjectivity and transparency. Another contemporary example is the prevention of housing or
employment ads from being systematically discriminatory. It is straightforward to see that simple
approaches, such as not allowing advertisers to use sensitive features like race or gender to select
their audience, are ineffective due to proxy features [74]. Proxies leave these approaches open
to adversarial hacks. Works that seek to address algorithmic discrimination or the problem of
proxies often encounter undesirable tradeoffs between individual and group interests [19, 48]
or between regulation and reward [22]. Determining how to balance these tradeoffs is both
subjective and controversial. Similarly to the first example, the one-size-fits-all solutions are also
brittle and do not adapt well with time.
One way to address these issues is to require that regulations are context-dependent in contrast to
global, one-size-fits-all rules. Specifically, they should depend on the nature of the interactions
between the specific user and platform under consideration. They should also depend on the
norms of the society on which the regulation intervenes. As described above, requiring that the
regulation is context-dependent is important in ensuring it is normative, flexible, and long-lasting.
Context-dependence is introduced in Section 2.2. This property addresses the social and reg-
ulator’s perspectives. By construction, the regulatory procedure we propose in Section 3 is
context-dependent because it utilizes a natural reference, which is defined next.
Natural reference. In order to understand the notion of a natural reference, it is necessary to
read the text directly above, under “context-dependent”, before proceeding.
In response to (b) on deciding who formulates the regulatory standard that determines when
an SMP has violated an AF regulation, there are several options. One option is the SMP itself.
However, this choice creates a conflict of interest and sets dangerous precedents (e.g., further
extends the reach of big tech into users’ private spheres by deciding what information users can
access for them). Another option is a set of experts, like a legislative committee with technical
advisers. This option removes the conflict of interest and provides a well-informed decision.
However, it can also cause unease when viewed as extending the reach of government into
citizens’ private spheres. A third option is the user. As detailed in Section 2.1 as well as under
“user-driven” and “consent” above, user-driven CBRs have many benefits, including empowering
the user and aligning the regulation with user preferences.
We propose to combine the latter two options to create what we term a natural reference: the
dimension along which the line is drawn is based on user consent (defined above), and the line’s
location along this dimension is determined by domain experts. In addition to being based
user-driven, a natural regulation is also context-dependent, which implies that judgments about
acceptability depend on the relevant legal and social norms, and that they are made on a platform-
and user-basis. Combining the collective discussions on consent and context-dependence, we
conclude that regulations based on natural references meet many desirable properties of online
governance in addition to being user-driven, normative, and adaptable.
The notion of a natural reference is introduced in Section 2.2 and used throughout the paper. In
the regulatory procedure, it appears through the concept of a natural feed.
Regulation-reward tradeoff. From the market perspective, the regulation should not place undue
financial burden on the involved parties. In particular, SMPs should be able to maintain revenue
sources so that they can continue to provide their services. Users should be able to access the good
that they seek and expect on the SMP, such as information, connections, and recommendations.
Moreover, advertisers and influencers should be able to obtain exposure to potential consumers.
Traditionally, one expects a tension between the social and market perspectives in the form of a
regulation-reward tradeoff. The common belief is that imposing a regulation hurts rewards, where the
reward R is measured in terms of profits, prediction accuracy, or another metric that is important to
the financial stakeholders. However, such a tradeoff may not necessarily hold. It is indeed possible
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that multiple (near) “optimal” solutions exist, where optimality is measured according to R, and
that not all of them are prohibited by the regulation. In such a situation, it may be feasible for the
regulation to guide SMPs to alternative (near) optimal solutions while ensuring that these solutions
abide by the regulation. We call such regulations low-cost.
The regulation-reward tradeoff is introduced in Section 2.3. Proving that this tradeoff does not
necessarily hold is one of the main contributions of our work. We examine this tradeoff by studying
the cost of regulation, discussed next.
Low-cost. Many works study the concept of optimality. Optimality, as discussed under “regulation-
reward tradeoff”, is measured with respect to a given reward function R(Φ), where Φ are the system
parameters. An optimal (resp. near-optimal) solution is a choice of Φ such that Φ is in the feasible
set and R(Φ) equals (resp. is close to) the maximum achievable reward R∗. The cost incurred by
choosing Φ is then R∗ − R(Φ). Therefore, a regulation is low-cost if it does not prevent the SMP,
advertisers, etc. from achieving a near-optimal reward.
Low-cost regulations are important to the market perspective and introduced in Section 2.3. The cost
of regulation is one of the focuses of our work and is formalized in Section 3.4. In Section 4, we prove
that there are conditions under which the cost of regulation is low or zero, thereby confirming that the
regulation-reward tradeoff does not necessarily hold. Moreover, we show that the SMP can lower its
cost by increasing the content diversity of a user’s feed, meaning that the proposed regulation aligns
social and financial interests. This relationship is illustrated in Appendices G.1 and F (Simulation 3).
Algorithmic content filtering. There are three parts to the definition of algorithmic filtering (AF)
[14, 27]. Filtering is the selection of content (e.g., posts, videos, photos, ads, comments, articles,
etc.) that are shown on a user’s feed. It is algorithmic because the selection typically utilizes an
algorithm that takes certain features—such as the user’s attributes (e.g., age or gender) and/or the
user’s history (e.g., web searches or previous actions on the platform)—as inputs and constructs the
user’s feed from current, available content as an output. The process of algorithmically filtering the
content is performed by the SMP in order to maximize some reward R that is generally a function of
user engagement and retention as well as profits. For example, the SMP may wish to maximize the
number of clicks on ads, weighted by the revenue each ad accrues. AF is closely related to popular
machine learning topics, including personalization algorithms [14] and recommender systems [50].
Regulating AF is the subject of our work because of its potential to produce negative side effects (see
Appendix A). We also focus on AF for two practical reasons. First, AF requires algorithm design
and can therefore be regulated. Second, it can be used to moderate another undesirable feature of
social media: filter bubbles (discussed next). In Section 2, we examine AF regulation from four
perspectives and produce a set of properties that an AF regulation should satisfy. The remainder of
the paper proposes, formalizes, and studies our regulatory procedure. As discussed in Appendix C.2,
we believe that addressing AF can mitigate many issues on social media that occur due to information
misrepresentation, also defined below.
Filter bubble. A filter bubble (FB) [59] is a state of information isolation that occurs when a user is
primarily shown content reinforcing her current beliefs. In this way, the user is isolated from opinions
that challenge her own. Filter bubbles are not necessarily filtered. They are often rooted in the user’s
personal connections (i.e., friends) on social media. As such, they are representative of the user’s real
(offline) social network. However, they can be amplified on social media due to factors, like feedback
loops in recommendation systems and the ease with which people share strong opinions online.
AF can also amplify as well as mitigate FBs. For instance, exclusively showing content that reinforces
the user’s beliefs amplifies the FB while increasing content diversity (defined below) can mitigate a
FB (colloquially referred to as “bursting” a FB). An important observation is that uncertainty plays a
large role here. In fact, increasing content diversity is a way of adding uncertainty to the user’s beliefs.
In contrast, the negative outcomes of FBs occur when the FB causes the user to have unwavering
certainty in her beliefs. We emphasize this connection to uncertainty and study it throughout Sections
3-5 (resp. Appendices C.2-F), in which we show that our regulation prevents FB amplification.
FBs are discussed intermittently throughout the work. They are introduced in Section 1 and defined
in Section 2.4. In our work, we explore how AF can mitigate FBs by increasing a user’s content
diversity. Note that our regulatory procedure prevents FBs from being amplified, and a detailed
explanation can be found under ”formalizing learning divergence” in Appendix C.2.
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Information misrepresentation (IM) & the effect of AF on user learning. As detailed in Sections
1 and Appendix A, a wide range of issues share the same root concern. Namely, as increasingly
popular information providers, SMPs have the power to influence user learning and decision-making.
While this influence is not necessarily negative, it can have unwanted side effects. We claim that many
of these issues can be classified as information misrepresentation (IM) of consensus, truth, and/or
opportunities, as summarized in Fig. 2. For instance, misrepresentation of consensus occurs when
ranking algorithms disproportionately favor comments that express controversial opinions, presenting
the debate as more polarizing than it might actually be. Misrepresentation of truth occurs when, for
example, misinformation (e.g., fake news) created by unreliable sources and becomes widely shared,
often due to algorithmic favoritism. Misrepresentation of opportunities captures situations in which
targeted advertising presents narrow choices (e.g., job listings or available housing) to users based on
incorrect and discriminatory judgments about user interests.
Motivated by this unifying perspective, our work attempts to address the question: How does AF
on social media affect user learning and decision-making? We concentrate on reducing information
representation’s effect on users relative to a natural reference.
Key observation: Information misrepresentation is alleviated by increasing content diversity
relative to an appropriately chosen natural reference. Intuitively, IM occurs when the content is
“biased” with respect to some reference. In Section 2.4 and under “natural reference” above, we
propose that such a reference must be natural. Using a natural reference, content is considered
locally biased (e.g., with respect to the user, platform, and relevant legal norms) when it deviates
significantly in distribution from the content to which that user has consented. Importantly, one
does not naïvely compare the “mean” of the user’s learning but the learned distribution, which is
important because distributions capture uncertainty. This nuance ensures that increasing content
diversity (defined below) relative to a natural reference not only mitigates the effect of IM on user
learning, but also prevents the amplification of FBs. (We choose the term “misrepresentation”
rather than “bias” because our formulation is local in the sense that the reference used to measure
“bias” is context-dependent.)
Example: Suppose female user X joins an SMP and, without regulation, the ads shown to X would
be initialized to favor beauty products. Then, increasing ad diversity gives X more options and
ensures the ads are not based on unjustified inferences. If, with time, X clicks on more ads relating
to beauty, then the natural distribution of X automatically shifts to favor these products, and
showing X more beauty products in the future would not be a violation of regulation. However,
if X only clicks on ads relating to books but the SMP continues to increase the proportion of (i.e.,
narrow the distribution around) beauty ads, then regulation is violated. Note that presenting X
with diverse options from which the SMP learns X’s interests also improves X’s user experience
and better matches advertisers to users.
Increasing a user’s content diversity relative to an appropriate reference has precedence in the
literature. It is at the heart of many approaches, including those for bursting FBs [15] and improving
comment ranking [37]. Increasing information gain across feeds, drowning out fake content, or
presenting different perspectives of the same issue are all forms of increasing content diversity [62].
Note that our work focuses on addressing the IM caused by AF and not the related and important
tasks of, for example, identifying fake news [68] or hate speech [23].
IM is introduced in Section 2.4. It is one of the fundamental motivations of our work, and our
regulatory procedure is designed to directly mitigate IM.
Socially responsible. We define measure that alleviate IM as socially responsible. In this sense, the
primary aim of this work is to design a socially responsible regulation or, equivalently, a regulation
that encourages socially responsible AF. This concept is introduced in Section 2.4 and referred to
throughout the work.
Content diversity. Content diversity is used to describe the heterogeneity of a user’s feed. (Impor-
tantly, we do not use it to describe the diversity of content across an entire SMP, but for a specific
user.) It is important from the social perspective as well as the market and user perspectives. From
the social perspective, increasing content diversity relative to a natural reference alleviates IM, as
explained above under “information misrepresentation” and in Section 2.4. From the market and user
perspective, diverse content provides the user with more options with which to interact. As such, it
gives the SMP a better understanding of the user’s interests based on her choices and therefore to
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also improves advertising matches. In addition, maintaining diversity means continually presenting
the user with different content, which allows advertisers and influencers good exposure to potential
consumers.
Content diversity is introduced in Section 2.4. It is formalized in Section 3.5 and analyzed in Sections
4 and 5 (resp. Appendices D and F). It is one of the focuses of our work, and we prove in Section
4 (resp. Appendices D-E) that one consequence of our proposed regulation is that, under certain
conditions, the SMP is naturally incentivized to increase content diversity in order to maximize its
reward and there is little to no cost of regulation. Phrased differently, in certain settings, the proposed
regulation aligns incentives and reverses the regulation-reward tradeoff.
Other related concepts & work. We include references to related works throughout the discussions
in Sections 1-4 (resp. Appendices B-C.2). In this final note, we touch on a few remaining concepts.
Self-regulation. Few regulations governing social media exist. As a consequence, SMPs are
almost entirely self-regulated [49, 82]. This details makes it even more crucial that an AF
regulation is designed carefully for two reasons. First, should the SMP decide to adopt the
self-regulation, there should be few, if any, ways for the SMP to tune the regulatory procedure.
Second, unless the self-regulation is low-cost, it is unlikely that the SMP willingly adopts it.
Social media issues. Current discussions on social media generally focus on specific issues,
such as whether content is inappropriate (e.g., hate speech [6, 23]); discriminatory (e.g., race-
based advertising [4, 71, 74, 46]); divisive (e.g., rankings that favors polarizing comments
[69]); insulating (e.g., filter bubbles [32]), or false (e.g., fake news [52, 18, 21]). These works
typically seek to increase content diversity (e.g., add heterogeneity to recommendations [15, 41]);
draw some global line (e.g., determining whether discrimination has occurred based on specific
demographic attributes and metrics [19]); or focusing on the origin of the content (e.g., reducing
fake news by whitelisting news sources [7]). However, there are legal and social barriers to
many of these approaches [49, 16, 7, 58], including concerns that regulations might damage free
speech or public discourse; violate personal rights or privacy; transfer agency away from users
to big tech or government; draw highly subjective lines between acceptable and unacceptable
behavior; or set dangerous precedents that cannot be reversed. Furthermore, one gap in the
approaches listed above is their focus on specific types of content. We depart from the literature
by (1) incorporating all types of content into our analysis using the concepts of IM and natural
references (see earlier in this section); and (2) proposing a set of desiderata that collectively
address key social, legal, and financial concerns of AF regulation.
Related technical areas. Our analysis relies on tools from statistics, optimization, and eco-
nomics. Our regulatory framework uses the framework of hypothesis testing [26], which is
model-based decision rule used in many approaches (see Appendix C.2). Once the regulation
has been set, we study its effects through the lens of an optimization problem. Specifically, the
SMP maximize its reward subject to the imposed regulatory constraints. This problem can be
viewed as an instance of robust optimization (RO) [8, 80]. We analyze the cost of regulation,
which is the loss in maximum achievable reward due to the regulatory constraints. Our definition
mirrors the “price” of robustness studied in other RO works [10, 9]. We study the tradeoff
(or lack thereof) between regulation and reward, which has also been examined in relation to
fairness [9, 31, 44] and privacy [17, 43] constraints, among others. It is worth a remark that our
analysis has parallels with the field of differential privacy (DP) [29, 30], which explores how to
protect individual privacy while preserving group-level trends in datasets by, similarly to our
work, comparing distributions under various interventions [78]. However, it differs in several key
ways, including: (1) the masking of attributes of individual units (e.g., posts) is not critical in
AF regulation whereas it are central to DP; (2) operationally, the SMP selects from an existing
collection of content and cannot add noise to a piece of content, which is the primary mechanism
of DP; and (3) the difference in settings elicits an entirely new set of questions, stakeholders,
tradeoffs, and metrics that require a separate, tailored analysis. Our approach is also in line with
social learning (SL) works [25, 5, 1, 54]. In SL, the objective of each agent is to learn the same
external signal and arrive at a consensus through information sharing, where the communications
are typically represented via a network. Similarly to SL, we study the evolution of a user’s belief
in time, with particular attention to the linear dynamical system. In our work, an algorithmic
information filter systematically perturbs the network communications for its own gain, and we
study how these perturbations can be regulated in the context of social media.
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C Regulatory procedure in detail (Section 3)
In this section of the Supplementary Material, we provide the regulatory procedure in detail and
address potential questions about operationalizing the regulation that may have arisen.
C.1 Setup and notation
Let’s recall the setup and notation. Consider a specific user and SMP (i.e., the regulation is user- and
platform-dependent). Let P = {pz(·;θ) : θ ∈ Θ} represent a family of models. Let the user’s feed
Z(t) at time t ≥ 0 consist of m pieces of content such that Z(t) = {z(t)1 , . . . , z(t)m }, z(t)i describes an
individual piece of content, and θ(t) is latent to the user. One can think of θ(t) as parametrizing the
generative model for the feed at time t. In the static or time-invariant setting, θ(t+1) = θ(t) for all t.
As the user browses through her feed, she implicitly forms a belief or posterior qz(·|Z(t)) based on
her observations Z(t). Suppose that qz(·|Z(t)) ∈ P such that qz(·|Z(t)) = pz(·; θ˜(t)). In other words,
θ˜(t) parameterizes the user’s belief at time t. Let the estimator A(t) represent the user’s learning
behavior such that the user’s updated beliefs are θ˜(t+1) = A(t)(Z(t), θ˜(t)). For notational clarity, the
time index t is omitted until Section 4 (resp. Appendix D).
For generality, let φF and φN be the hyperparameters that determine the generative model parameters
θF and θN , such that θF = h(φF ) and θN = h(φN) for some deterministic function h(·). Let
Φ = (m,φN ,φF ) be the full set of hyperparameters. For a specific user, m and φN are given, and
the SMP filters the content by controlling φF .
C.2 Explaining regulatory procedure in detail
In short, the regulatory procedure is designed to prevent learning divergence. As such, the proposed
regulation provably mitigates the negative side effects of AF by directly addressing IM, as defined
in Section B. The regulatory procedure is formulated using a hypothesis testing framework. In
formalizing the procedure, we use some well-known and powerful technical results to show that it
is feasible to operationalize our procedure in a data-driven way. By construction (specifically, the
use a natural reference), the proposed regulation is user-driven and context-dependent, therefore
satisfying two of the four regulation desiderata in Section 3 (resp. Appendix B). For the remaining
two desiderata, we formalize two metrics: the cost of regulation and content diversity. In Section 4
(resp. Appendices D-E), we study the effect of regulation on these two quantities.
User’s learning behavior. Every user’s beliefs are implicitly affected by the information that she
views on her feed. In this work, we consider a specific user and denote her learning behavior (i.e.,
how her beliefs are affected) at time t by A(t). For example, if the user is stubborn, and her beliefs
remain the same no matter what she is shown, then θ˜(t+1) = θ˜(t) = A(t)(Z(t), θ˜(t)) is unaffected by
Z(t). On the other hand, suppose the user is affected by the feed. One way to formalize the learning
behavior would be to say that the user believes the features z are linearly related, and A(t) = A is the
linear least-squares estimator. In many cases, it is not possible to obtain or deduce A(t); we show that
there is a mathematical workaround, allowing regulation to be operationalized without knowledge of
A(t) (see Lemma 1 and the notes on the UMP and MVUE below).
Formalizing learning divergence. Before proceeding, we recommend reading through the discus-
sion on what constitutes a natural reference, as defined in Section 2 and Appendix B. Given a natural
reference, one can determine what would have constituted a natural feed ZN for the user (note that ZN
is user- and platform- dependent). In reality, the user’s feed is algorithmically filtered, resulting in the
filtered feed ZF . Learning divergence occurs when the user’s learned belief under ZF is sufficiently
different from that under ZN , where the learned belief depends on the user’s learning behavior A (see
above) and the “difference” is measured using a distance metric d(θ˜F , θ˜N).
There a very important detail in this formulation. As should be evident from the setup above, the
user’s belief θ˜ is a distribution and therefore captures not only the learned “relationship” between
features z, but also the user’s certainty in this learned relationship. For example, imagine that
the user is deciding whether to go to graduate school. If she observes several PhD graduates
acquiring good jobs, she may be hesitant. However, if she is shown an overwhelming large
number of such cases, she may become convinced that a good job necessitates a PhD, even if
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it does not, and begin pursuing one. Therefore, the certainty of a belief plays a crucial role in
decision-making, as captured in the explore-exploit trade-off [73]. This distinction between
simply comparing learned relationships and more holistically comparing learned beliefs (or
distributions) is at the heart of many issues on social media. For instance, filter bubbles occur
when the certainty a user assigns to a learned relationship is extremely high. Similarly, the spread
of fake news is most harmful when it is continually injected into a social network and dominates
the feeds of every individual in that network, causing them to become convinced that it must be
true. As such, the distance between learned beliefs d(θ˜F , θ˜N) can be large when the certainty
associated with the beliefs are very different even if the underlying “relationships” are the same.
In other words, learning divergence occurs when AF causes the user to learn an internal belief that
is very different in distribution from that she would have learned without AF. As explained above,
this difference in distribution captures the effect of AF on not only the user’s learning, but also her
decision-making. Three operational considerations—the user’s learning behavior A, the regulator’s
access to data ZN or ZF , and the distance metric d(·, ·)—are addressed below.
Hypothesis testing. As formalized in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the regulator tests for learning divergence
using hypothesis testing [26]. Hypothesis testing is a model-based decision-rule that has been used in
many similar problems, like differential privacy [78]. It is a data-driven procedure that is appropriate
to this context for two reasons. First, hypothesis testing is the most basic form of decision-making,
meaning it can be specialized to address the downstream motivation of this work: studying the
effect of AF on user decision-making. Secondly, a regulator should only investigate or penalize an
SMP when it has sufficient evidence to argue its case. As such, an assumption of innocence (the
null hypothesis) that is only rejected when the regulator has enough evidence to claim the SMP has
caused systematic learning divergence (the alternative hypothesis) with high confidence is fitting.
The necessary amount of evidence or, equivalently, confidence is tuned using .
-rejection: Recall from Section 3.3 that -rejection is equivalent to the detection of learning
divergence, derived from the hypothesis testing framework (see directly above). It states that the
regulator detects learning divergence when he can reject the null hypothesis with (1− ) confidence
(i.e., when the regulator has enough evidence). Note that  represents a maximum false positive rate.
The precise definition is given as follows.
Definition 1 (-rejection). Given  ∈ (0, 1), the regulator decides H˜ = H1 when d(θ˜N , θ˜F ) >
δ, where δ > 0 is chosen so that P(H˜ = H1|H0) ≤ , and H˜ = H0 otherwise. This rule
detects learning divergence with (1− ) confidence.
How to set the threshold δ is discussed below under “Determining threshold δ”.
Uniformly most powerful (UMP) hypothesis test. The UMP test is the best worst-case test, as
follows. A hypothesis test can be evaluated using two metrics: the true positive rate (TPR) and the
false positive rate (FPR), where one prefers a high TPR and low FPR. Suppose that the FPR must be
at most . Then, the UMP is the best worst-case test because it gives the highest TPR test under the
constraint that the FPR ≤ . This is precisely the test that we are interested in. The regulator wishes
to prevent learning divergence, or equivalently -rejection. Without knowledge of the user’s learning
behavior (obtaining it could be expensive or a violation of that user’s privacy), the regulator can
prevent learning divergence by preventing it for all possible users (i.e., the most adversarial version
of A). The most adversarial version of A represents the worst-case scenario. Since the regulator
needs to be able to detect learning divergence reliably, he would like the best possible hypothesis test.
Therefore, the regulator wants the best worst-case, or UMP, test. Formally, given a maximum FPR 
and hypothesis classH, the UMP test H˜+ satisfies:
H˜+ = sup
H˜∈H :FPR(H˜)≤
TPR(H˜).
Note that the UMP does not always exist.
Minimum-variance unbiased estimator (MVUE). Consider an experiment in which an observer is
shown dataset Z, where z ∼ pz(·; η) and η is a deterministic but unknown parameter. The goal of the
observer is to estimate (or learn) η from observation Z. The observer’s estimator is denoted as η˜(Z).
The mean-square error (MSE) of an estimator is given by:
MSE = EZ∼pz(·;η)[(η˜(Z)− η)2].
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It turns out that the MSE can be decomposed into two terms:
MSE = VarZ(η˜(Z)) + bZ(η˜(Z))2,
where the first term is the variance of the estimator VarZ(η˜(Z)) = EZ[η˜(Z)2] − EZ[η˜(Z)]2 and
the second term is the bias of the estimator bZ(η˜(Z)) = EZ[η˜(Z)] − η. In estimation theory, one
desirable (almost essential) property is that an estimator is unbiased, i.e., bZ(η˜(Z)) = 0. The MVUE,
if it exists, is the unbiased estimator with the minimum variance. By the decomposition above,
the MVUE minimizes the MSE among all unbiased estimators. The MVUE is closely related to
many important concepts in estimation theory, including efficient estimators, the Cramér-Rao bound,
sufficient statistics, and the Rao-Blackwell theorem. Note that the MVUE does not always exist.
Relationship between UMP test and MVUE. Lemma 1 effectively says that, for a one-sided binary
composite hypothesis test, the UMP (if it exists) is simply the hypothesis test that uses a threshold
determined by the MVUE. In other words, when the (one-dimensional) parameter η that is used to
make a decision is unknown, first estimate it using the MVUE η˜+. Next, use the MVUE η˜+ as a
placeholder for η, and find the threshold η at which the FPR equals . Then, the UMP is precisely
the decision rule that tests η˜+ against the threshold η.
To make this notion precise, recall Lemma 1, as given below.
Lemma 1 ([36], Theorem 1). Consider a one-sided binary composite hypothesis tests H0 : w ∼
pw(·; η), η ≤ ηb against H1 : w ∼ pw(·; η), η > ηb, where ηb is known. Let Ω0 = {η : η ≤ ηb},
Ω1 = {η : η > ηb}, and Ω = Ω0 ∪ Ω1. Let  the allowable false positive rate. If the uniformly
most powerful (UMP) test exists, then it is defined by the following decision rule: reject H0 when
the MVUE of η ∈ Ω, denoted by η˜+, satisfies η˜+ > η, where P (η˜+ > η|H = H0) = .
In our setting, η = d(θF ,θN), and the null hypothesis is that d(θF ,θN) = 0. By the logic in the
definition of the UMP test above, Lemma 1 motivates the regulator to focus on the MVUE A+. In
other words, designing the regulation to prevent learning divergence for a user with learning behavior
A+ simultaneously ensures that it prevents learning divergence for all other users. Note that this
result is for the setting with a one-dimensional parameter η; in the same work [36], the authors also
mention that the multi-dimensional parameter case can be handled by hypothesis test using a linear
combination of the MVUE for each individual parameter.
Determining threshold δ. Combining Definition 1 and Lemma 1, the hypothesis test threshold is
found by solving for δ such that:
P(d(θ˜+(Z1), θ˜+(Z2)) > δ|H0) = ,
where Z1 and Z2 are data from generative models θ1 and θ2. Recall that H0 : θ1 = θ2. In some
cases, it may be difficult to solve for this equation with equality. In this scenario, it may be possible
to upper bound the left-hand side, then solve for equality, such that:
P(d(θ˜+(Z1), θ˜+(Z2)) > δ|H0) ≤ . (5)
In our work, we use the shortened notation: θ˜+(ZN) = θ˜
+
N and θ˜
+(ZF ) = θ˜
+
F . We use the same
abbreviation for θ˜N and θ˜F .
Distance metric. Learning divergence (defined above) uses a distance metric d(θ˜F , θ˜N) to measure
the difference between the beliefs of a user under filtered or natural content. This distance metric is
determined by the regulator. The use of a distance metric appears in many instances. For example, it
is the basis for the two-sample t-test, which determines whether the means of two i.i.d. Gaussian
datasets are equal. One important note is that there are conditions for which the detection of learning
divergence is agnostic to the definition of d(·, ·) as long as it is a valid distance metric. In particular,
if the hypothesis test can be decomposed into separate hypothesis tests over each component such
that such that the null hypothesis for the k-th component test is Hk0 : dk(θ˜F,k, θ˜N,k) = 0, then the
test is agnostic to the definition of dk(·, ·) as long as it is a valid distance metric. This property is
desirable because it means regulation does not depend on the choice of distance metric.
Regulation. The regulation prescribes that learning divergence is rare. The regulatory framework is
both user-driven and context-dependent by construction, thereby satisfying two of the desiderata in
Section 2. A pseudo-code style description of the regulatory procedure is given in Algorithm C.1.
The precise definition is given as follows.
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Algorithm C.1: Regulatory procedure
Input: M anonymized filtered feeds {Z(t)F,j}Mj=1 and corresponding natural feeds {Z(t)N,j}Mj=1 for
t = ts, ts + 1, . . . , tf; regulation parameters α and ; and distance metric d(·, ·).
Result: Decision whether investigate SMP for AF regulation violation.
Initialize number of violations to 0;
Given Θ, determine MVUE θ˜+(Z), which produces estimates for θ based on observation Z;
Solve for δ > 0 such that (5) holds;
for t = ts, ts + 1, . . . , tf do
for j = 1, . . . ,M do
if d
(
θ˜+(Z(t)N,j), θ˜
+(Z(t)F,j)
)
> δ then
Increment number of violations;
end
end
end
if (number of violations)/((tf − ts) · |U |) > α then
Investigate AF regulation violation;
else
Do not investigate.
end
Definition 2 ((α, )-regulation). For α,  ∈ (0, 1), the regulator requires that -rejection occur
with frequency no more than α.
α and  are parameters that determine the strictness of regulation.  represents the maximum FPR that
the regulator is willing to accept when deciding to investigate an SMP for a violation. α represents
the allowance the regulator gives to the SMP. Therefore, decreasing  and increasing α would make
regulation less strict. Both generally take on small values. As discussed in Section 2.2 and in
Appendix B, α and  would be determined by legal and technical domain experts. As hypothetical
examples,  could be determined by empirical psychological studies on the confidence level at which
people change their behaviors [79], and α could be determined by network scientists based on the
proportion at which cascading behavior [47] is observed.
Access to data. The proposed hypothesis testing procedure is data-driven, relying on access to ZN
and ZF . There are two ways to access this data without invasions to privacy or much expense.
The first option is that the SMP is self-regulated. At the moment, SMPs are almost entirely
self-regulated [49]. Due to the current social, legal, and political landscape, it is likely that
SMPs will continue to be self-regulated for at least the near future. (This outcome makes the
fact that our proposed regulation is low-cost even more appealing. A low-cost regulation would
incentivize SMPs to self-regulate since it is advantageous for SMPs to be able to claim that their
AF is socially responsible while incurring minimal financial cost.) Under self-regulation, the
SMP has access to ZN and ZF , and this issue is immediately resolved.
The second option is to provide anonymized data to the regulator. While the anonymization
of data is a hot topic because there are scenarios under which datasets can be “de-anonymized”
[56, 24], we propose that this issue could be bypassed in our setting for several reasons. One
reason is that there would be no defensible justification for the anonymized dataset to be publicly
shared; as such, it would be delivered to the regulator, undergo the hypothesis testing procedure,
and be subsequently deleted. There would be no need to at any time de-anonymize it or share it
with anyone who would want to de-anonymize it. As such, the likelihood of this information
falling into the wrong hands would be the same as the likelihood of the original SMP data
falling into the wrong hands. Another reason is that the regulatory procedure only requires the
numerical features z; any semantic interpretation of these features are not necessary, meaning
that de-anonymization would require significant effort that, as pointed out above, the regulator is
not incentivized to undertake. (The definition of features z is discussed below.) Finally, while
the regulated behavior is user-specific, the regulatory decision is platform-wide. As such, the
proposed regulatory decisions do not single out individual users.
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Feature definitions. The features z are used to describe pieces of content. For example, suppose that
z = (y,x), where y ∈ [−1, 1] represents the sentiment that the piece of content assigns to the opinion
x ∈ [−1, 1]r. The choice of features undoubtedly affects regulation but is out of the scope of our
work. However, we offer a quick observation. We believe that, irrespective of regulation, there are
incentives for the SMP to construct good feature descriptors for its content because feature descriptors
are used to improve personalization, recommendations, ad matching, etc. If this observation holds
true, then the features descriptors used for regulation would only be poor if the SMP choses the
features adversarially. As long as the SMP chooses z in good-faith (or is required to use the same
features for their other services), then the descriptors are likely to be sufficiently good.
(α, )-matching. The SMP avoids receiving a penalty by performing hypothesis testing.
The precise definition is given as follows. Intuitively, the easier it is for the user to learn the
generative model with high certainty, the more similar θF and θN must be to meet regulation.
Definition 3 ((α, )-matching). The SMP ensures with (1− α)-confidence that -rejection does
not occur by choosing θF relative to θN such that d(θ˜
+
N , θ˜
+
F )>δ with frequency no more than α.
SMP’s optimization problem. The SMP’s objective is to maximize its reward R (e.g., profits,
number of accrued clicks) while meeting regulation by performing (α, )-matching as follows:
max
φF
R (Φ) such that P
(
d
(
θ˜F , θ˜N
)
> δ
∣∣Φ) < α. (1)
The above can be viewed as robust optimization [8, 80].
Definition 4 (Feasible set). The feasible set is defined as the set of values for φF given m and
φN such that the regulatory constraint in (1) is satisfied.
Cost of regulation. Let φ∗F be the solution to (1) and Φ∗ = (m,φN ,φ
∗
F ). The cost of regulation is
the “penalty” imposed by the regulation on the SMP. It mirrors the “price” of robustness or fairness
studied in other works [10, 9].
The precise definition is given as follows.
Definition 5 (Cost of regulation). The cost of regulation is defined as the difference between the
maximum reward with and without regulation:
(
maxφF R(Φ)
)−R(Φ∗).
Intuitively, the SMP prefers that the cost of regulation is low, which occurs when the feasible set is
sufficiently large. A low-cost regulation is also advantageous from the regulator’s perspective because
it makes the SMP more likely to accept regulatory measures and to abide by them without exploiting
loopholes that prevent the regulation from being carried out to its intended end. In particular, if
self-regulation is the most likely path, then a low-cost self-regulation is a win-win: it allows the SMP
to claim that their AF is socially responsible while also achieving near-optimal reward.
Formalizing content diversity. As explained in Section 2.4 and Appendix B, content diversity is
vital to mitigating IM and addressing the negative social side effects of AF.
The measure content diversity, we provide the following definition.
Definition 6 (Content diversity). The content diversity of a feed Z is defined as its entropy [38].
In this definition, “entropy” refers to information entropy [38], which is a measure of the “amount
of information” in a random variable’s possible outcomes. Therefore, the higher the entropy
of a feed, the harder it is to describe the information in the feed succinctly (e.g., the views in
the feed are different enough that they cannot all be described by one sentence). Entropy is
commonly used to measure diversity [57, 45]. Semantically, one can differentiate between topic
and outcome diversity. In Section 4, we focus on outcome diversity (i.e., for a given topic, how
diverse are the outcomes y associated with topic x across the feed).
Model family. Recall that P = {pz(·;θ) : θ ∈ Θ} is the model family containing the generative
and learned models. Specifically, the data are generated according to zi ∼ fz(·) = pz(·;θ) ∈ P ,
and the user’s belief after observing Z(t) is qz(·|Z(t)) = pz(·; θ˜(t)) ∈ P . This setup is general as Θ
can be as large as desired. It is important to note that the choice of P is an implicit assumption that
can impact the results. Choosing P is a popular area of study known as model selection [34]. For
context, our results in Section 4 restrict P to time-invariant (static) and time-varying (dynamic) linear
Gaussian models.
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D Results & proofs for Section 4
D.1 Intermediate results: Decomposing the optimization problem
Let θ˜ ∈ RL. For all k ∈ [L], let δ,k be defined analogously to Definition 1: given  ∈ (0, 1),
P(d(θ˜N,k, θ˜F,k) > δ,k|H = H0) = . The following result allows the regulator (or SMP) to check
whether φF is in the feasible set by decomposing the multivariate constraint in (1) into separate
constraints on each component of the parameters θ˜. Intuitively, the regulator (or SMP) checks whether
it belongs to smaller set that is entirely contained within the feasible set.
Proposition D.1. If P(d(θ˜F,k, θ˜N,k) > δ,k|Φ) < αk for all k ∈ [L] where
∑
k∈[L] αk ≤ α, then the
constraint in (1) holds.
Proof. Let {H˜ = H1} denote the event when the regulator rejects the null hypothesis. For any
k ∈ [L], let:
H0,k : θN,k = θF,k,
H1,k : θN,k 6= θF,k.
Then, it follows that: {
H˜ = H1
}
= ∪k∈[L]
{
H˜k = H1,k
}
.
In other words, if the regulator decides that any of the model parameters are not equal, then the
original null hypothesis H0 cannot hold. Applying the union bound:
P
(
H˜ = H1
∣∣Φ) = P(∪k∈[L]{H˜k = H1,k}∣∣Φ) ≤ ∑
k∈[L]
P
(
H˜k = H1,k
∣∣Φ) .
By Definition 1:
H˜k = H1,k ⇐⇒ d
(
θ˜N.k, θ˜F,k
)
> δ,k.
Therefore,
P
(
H˜ = H1|Φ
)
≤
∑
k∈[L]
P
(
d
(
θ˜N,k, θ˜F,k
)
> δ,k
∣∣∣Φ) ,
implying that: ∑
k∈[L]
P
(
d
(
θ˜N,k, θ˜F,k
)
> δ,k
∣∣∣Φ) < α =⇒ P(H˜ = H1|Φ) < α,
which gives the desired result.
Reformulated optimization problem. By Proposition D.1, the SMP also meets regulation when
solving the following optimization problem:
max
φF
R (Φ)
s.t. P
(
d
(
θ˜N,k, θ˜F,k
)
> δ,k
∣∣Φ) < αk ∀k ∈ [L],∑
k∈[L]
αk ≤ α, (6)
D.2 Assumption & concentration inequalities
Recall the following assumption, where θ˜+N and θ˜
+
F denote the MVUE estimates of generative model
parameters θN and θF .
Assumption 2. The regulator estimates tail probabilities of θ˜+N and θ˜
+
F using finite-sample Gaussian
and sub-Gamma concentration inequalities.
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The precise form of the Gaussian concentration inequality is as follows [77]. If U ∼ N (µ, σ2), then:
P(U ≥ µ+ s) ≤ exp
(
− s
2
2σ2
)
. (7)
Moreover, the Gaussian bound is sharp to polynomial-factor corrections.
The precise form of the sub-Gamma concentration inequality is as follows [28]. Let Γ(a, b) denote
a gamma distribution with shape parameter a and scale parameter b, and let SG(v, c) denote a
sub-gamma random variable with variance factor v and scale parameter c. Then, if U ∈ Γ(a, b):
P(U ≥ s) ≤ exp
(
− s
2
2(a+ bs)
)
, (8)
which is derived from the Cramér-Chernoff inequality.
D.3 Intermediate results: Properties and useful lemmas
The following properties and lemmas will be used in later proofs. Let χ2(n) denote a chi-squared
random variable with n degrees of freedom. The notation for gamma and sub-gamma distributions
are the same as in Section D.2
Property D.1. U ∼ χ2(n) =⇒ U ∼ Γ(n/2, 2) [67].
Property D.2. For any g > 0, U ∼ Γ(a, b) =⇒ rU ∼ Γ(a, gb) [33].
Property D.3. U ∼ Γ(a, b) =⇒ U ∈ SG(ab2, b) [12].
Property D.4. Suppose U ∈ SG(aU , bU ) is independent of V ∈ SG(aV , bV ). Then, U + V ∈
SG(aU + aV ,max(bU , bV )) [28].
From these four properties, it can be shown that:
Property D.5. Then, U ∼ χ2(n) =⇒ g(U − E[U ]) ∈ SG(2ng2, 2g) for any g > 0.
From these properties, we can derive two useful lemmas.
Lemma D.2. Suppose nσ˜2/σ2 ∼ χ2(n). Then,
σ˜2 − σ2 ∈ SG
(
2σ4
n
,
2σ2
n
)
.
Proof. This result follows directly from Property D.5.
Let σc0 := σ
c
N + σ
c
F . With slight abuse of notation, let σ
2∨4
0 := max(σ
2
0 , σ
4
0). Define analogous
notation for the placeholder variables σ˜20 and σ˜
2∨4
0 as well as for σˆ
2
0 and σˆ
2∨4
0 .
Lemma D.3. Suppose that:
σ˜2j − σ2j ∈ SG
(
σ4j
nj
,
σ2j
nj
)
,
for some nj > 0 and j ∈ {N,F}. Then,
(σ˜2N + σ˜
2
F )− (σ2N + σ2F ) ∈ SG
(
σ4N
nN
+
σ4F
nF
,max
(
σ2N
nN
,
σ2F
nF
))
,
(σ˜2N − σ˜2F )− (σ2N − σ2F ) ∈ SG
(
σ4N
nN
+
σ4F
nF
,max
(
σ2N
nN
,
σ2F
nF
))
.
Let U = (σ˜2N + σ˜
2
F )− (σ2N + σ2F ) or U = (σ˜2N − σ˜2F )− (σ2N − σ2F ). In either case, we have that:
P (U ≥ Λ) ≤ exp
− Λ2
2
(
σ4N
nN
+
σ4F
nF
+ Λ max
(
σ2N
nN
,
σ2F
nF
))
 ≤ exp(−Λ− 1
2Y
)
,
for Λ > 0, where:
Y =
σ2∨40
min(nN , nF )
.
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Proof. The first result follows directly from Property D.4. The first inequality in the tail bound result
follows from (8). The second inequality follows from:
P (U ≥ Λ) ≤ exp
− Λ2
2
(
σ4N
nN
+
σ4F
nF
+ Λ max
(
σ2N
nN
,
σ2F
nF
))
 ,
≤ exp
− Λ2
2
(
σ4N
nN
+
σ4F
nF
+ Λ
(
σ2N
nN
+
σ2F
nF
))
 ,
≤ exp
(
− Λ
2
2Y (1 + Λ)
)
,
≤ exp
(
−Λ− 1
2Y
)
,
which completes the proof.
D.4 Intermediate results: Key theorems
In this section, we provide two key intermediate results. Note that we have not yet restricted ourselves
to the linear Gaussian time-invariant or time-varying settings.
As motivated in Section 3 and Appendix C.2, the regulator only considers the user who uses the
MVUE A+. As such, for the remainder of this document, it is assumed that any user estimates are
those relevant to the regulatory procedure and therefore from the MVUE.
Let θ = (β1, . . . , βr, σ21 , . . . , σ
2
r) denote the generative model parameters. Let the user’s parameter
estimates θ˜ after observing data Z be defined anaologously. For j ∈ {N,F}, suppose that:
β˜j ∼ N (βj ,Σj), (9)
and:
σ˜2j,k − σ2j,k ∈ SG
(
σ4j,k
nj
,
σ2j,k
nj
)
, (10)
for all k ∈ [r], where σ2j,k = Σj,kk, σ˜2j,k = Σ˜j,kk, and nj > 0.
Let d(a,b) = |a− b|1. For a given K ≥ 1, let:
K¯ =
{
K, σ20,k > σ
4
0,k,√
K, otherwise.
Lastly, define:
pK := exp
(
−min(nN , nF )
2σ2∨40,k
(
K − 1
K
σ20,k − 1
))
,
SK(κ) := 2(1− pK)
( 
2
) 1
κ
+ 2pK .
The following results are key intermediate steps to our main results.
Theorem D.4. Let γk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ [r] and
∑r
k=1 γk = γ. Then, under Assumptions 1, the
(γ, )-matching of β˜N and β˜F is achieved by choosing βF given βN and m such that, for all k ∈ [r],
βF,k satisfies:
|βN,k − βF,k| := dβk ≤ sup
{K :K≥1∩γk≥SK(K)}
√
2σ20,k
(√
1
K
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− pK)
γk − 2pK
))
.
(11)
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Proof. First, we use Proposition D.1 from Appendix D.1. This result implies that the (γ, )-matching
of means can be achieved by (γk, )-matching β˜N,k and β˜F,k for all k ∈ [r] and
∑r
k=1 γk = γ. Recall
that d(a, b) = |a − b|. Let dβk = d(βN,k, βF,k), and dβ˜k = d(β˜N,k, β˜F,k). Then, by (9) and the
well-known property for the sum of independent Gaussian variables,
β˜N,k − β˜F,k ∼ N (βN,k − βF,k, σ20,k). (12)
The remainder of the proof is split into two steps: -rejection and (γk, )-matching.
Part I: -rejection. We first begin by finding when -rejection occurs. Recall that the regulator
uses the decision rule H˜ and that H = H0 =⇒ βN,k = βF,k ∩ σ2N,k = σ2F,k. To choose H˜ that
satisfies (5), we utilize Assumption 1. Applying the Gaussian concentration inequality (7) to (12)
under H = H0 for some δ ≥ 0 yields:
P
(
dβ˜k ≥ δ|H = H0, σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
(13)
= P
(
|β˜N,k − β˜F,k| ≥ δ|H = H0, σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
= 2P
(
(β˜N,k − β˜F,k)− (βN,k − βF,k) ≥ δ|H = H0, σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
= 2P
(
β˜N,k − β˜F,k ≥ δ|σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− δ
2
2σˆ20,k
)
. (14)
We condition on σ˜20,k = σˆ
2
0,k because σ0,k itself is unknown, meaning that σ˜
2
0,k is a random variable.
Then, satisfying (5) means bounding (14) by , such that:
P
(
dβ˜k ≥ δ|H = H0, σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− δ
2
2σˆ20,k
)
≤ ,
which means that the regulator selects H˜ = H1 when dβ˜k ≥ δ, where:
δ2 = 2σˆ
2
0,k ln
(
2

)
.
Therefore, -rejection as defined in Definition 1 occurs when H˜ = H1 ⇐⇒ dβ˜k ≥ δ.
Part II: (γk, )-matching. For a given φN and m, the objective of the SMP, by Definition 3, is to set
φF such that P(|β˜N,k − β˜F,k| ≥ δ|Φ = (m,φN ,φF )) ≤ γk. This can be achieved by requiring that:
P((β˜N,k − β˜F,k) ≥ δ|Φ) = P((β˜N,k − β˜F,k)− (βN,k − βF,k) ≥ δ − (βN,k − βF,k)|Φ) ≤ γk
2
,
P((β˜F,k − β˜N,k) ≥ δ|Φ) = P((β˜F,k − β˜N,k)− (βF,k − βN,k) ≥ δ − (βF,k − βN,k)|Φ) ≤ γk
2
.
Since the analysis for the second inequality is symmetric to that for the first, we focus on the first.
For some s ≥ 0, we apply (7) to obtain:
P((β˜N,k − β˜F,k)− (βN,k − βF,k) ≥ δ − (βN,k − βF,k)|Φ) (15)
= P((β˜N,k − β˜F,k)− (βN,k − βF,k) ≥ δ − (βN,k − βF,k)|σ˜20,k < s2,Φ)P(σ˜20,k < s2|Φ)
+ P((β˜N,k − β˜F,k)− (βN,k − βF,k) ≥ δ − (βN,k − βF,k)|σ˜20,k ≥ s2,Φ)P(σ˜20,k ≥ s2|Φ)
≤ (1− P (σ˜20,k < s2|Φ)) exp
−
(√
2s2 ln
(
2

)− βN,k + βF,k)2
2σ20,k
+ P (σ˜20,k < s2|Φ) (1),
(16)
where the equality follows from conditioning and marginalizing, and the inequality follows two
observations. First, that the probability is upper bounded by 1 and, second, that as σ˜20,k decreases, the
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tail probability decreases, so the tail probability for any σ˜20,k ∈ [0, s2) is upper bounded by the tail
probability for σ˜20,k = s
2.
We will now set s2 and find P
(
σ˜20,k < s
2|Φ
)
. Let s2 = σ20,k/K for some K ≥ 1. Then, from
Lemma D.3,
P
(
σ˜20,k < s
2|Φ) = P(σ˜20,k − σ20,k < −K − 1K σ20,k∣∣∣Φ
)
≤ exp
(
− (K − 1)σ
2
0,k −K
2KR
)
≤ exp
(
−min(nN , nF )((K − 1)σ
2
0,k −K)
2Kσ4∨20,k
)
≤ exp
(
−min(nN , nF )
2σ4∨20,k
(
K − 1
K
σ20,k − 1
))
=: pK . (17)
The objective of (γk, )-matching is to upper bound (15) by γk/2. Continuing the analysis from (16):
P((β˜N,k − β˜F,k)− (βN,k − βF,k) ≥ ∆ − (βN,k − βF,k)|Φ)
≤ (1− P (σ˜20,k < s2|Φ)) exp
−
(√
2s2 ln
(
2

)− βN,k + βF,k)2
2σ20,k
+ P (σ˜20,k < s2|Φ)
≤ (1− pK) exp
−
(√
(2σ20,k/K) ln
(
2

)− βN,k + βF,k)2
2σ20,k
+ pK
≤ γk
2
.
Applying a symmetric argument to β˜F,k − β˜N,k and solving both for dβk yields the result:
|βN,k − βF,k| ≤
√
2σ20,k
(√
1
K
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− pK)
γk − 2pK
))
.
Recall that this analysis requires that K ≥ 1 and that the right-hand side (specifically, the quantity
inside the parentheses) of the inequality above is positive. Taking the supremum over these two
conditions yields the theorem result.
Remark D.1. When the distribution variances are known (i.e., σ2j,k are known), then there is no
randomness in σ˜2j,k. In this case, one can set K = 1 and pK = 0.
Theorem D.5. Let νk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ [r] and
∑r
k=1 νk = ν. Then, under Assumption 1, the
(ν, )-matching of σ˜2N,k and σ˜
2
F,k for all k ∈ [r] is achieved by choosing σ2F,k given σ2N,k and m such
that σ2F,k satisfies:
|σ2N,k−σ2F,k| := dσ2k ≤ sup{K :K≥1∩νk≥SK¯(K)}
2σ2∨40,k
min(nN , nF )
(
1
K
ln
(
2

)
− ln
(
2(1− pK¯)
νk − 2pK¯
))
. (18)
Proof. This proof mirrors that given for Theorem D.4. First, we use Proposition D.1 from Appendix
D.1. This result implies that the (ν, )-matching of variances can be achieved by (νk, )-matching σ˜2N,k
and σ˜2F,k for all k ∈ [r] and
∑r
k=1 γk = γ. Recall that d(a, b) = |a− b|. Let dσ2k = d(σ2N,k, σ2F,k),
and dσ˜2k = d(σ˜
2
N,k, σ˜
2
F,k). Then, by (10) and Property D.4 (which we can use due to Assumption 1),
(σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ∈ SG
(
σ4N,k
nN
+
σ4F,k
nF
,max
(
σ2N,k
nN
,
σ2F,k
nF
))
. (19)
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The remainder of the proof is split into two steps: -rejection and (νk, )-matching.
Part I: -rejection. We first begin by finding when -rejection occurs. Recall that the regulator
uses the decision rule H˜ and that H0 =⇒ σ2N,k = σ2F,k. To choose H˜ that satisfies (5), we utilize
Assumption 1. Applying Lemma D.3
P
(
dσ˜2k ≥ Λ|H = H0, σ˜
2
0,k = σˆ
2
0,k
)
= 2P
(
(σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ≥ Λ|H = H0, σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
= 2P
(
σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k ≥ Λ|σ˜20,k = σˆ20,k
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− (Λ− 1) min(nN , nF )
2σˆ4∨20,k
)
(20)
Then, satisfying (5) means bounding (20) by . As a result, the regulator selects H˜ = H1 when
dσ˜2k ≥ Λ where:
Λ =
2σˆ4∨20,k
min(nN , nF )
ln
(
2

)
+ 1, (21)
Therefore, -rejection as defined in Definition 1 occurs when H˜ = H1 ⇐⇒ dσ˜2k ≥ Λ.
Part II: (νk, )-matching. For a given φN and m, the objective of the SMP, by Definition 3, is to set
φF such that P(|σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k| ≥ Λ|Φ) ≤ νk. This can be achieved by requiring that:
P((σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k) ≥ Λ|Φ) = P((σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ≥ Λ − (σ2N,k − σ2F,k)|Φ) ≤
νk
2
,
P((σ˜2F,k − σ˜2N,k) ≥ Λ|Φ) = P((σ˜2F,k − σ˜2N,k)− (σ2F,k − σ2N,k) ≥ Λ − (σ2F,k − σ2N,k)|Φ) ≤
νk
2
.
Since the analysis for the second inequality is symmetric to that for the first, we focus on the first.
Again applying Lemma D.3 yields:
P((σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ≥ Λ − (σ2N,k − σ2F,k)|Φ)
= P
(
(σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ≥ Λ − (σ2N,k − σ2F,k)
∣∣σ˜20,k ≥ s¯2,Φ)P (σ˜20,k ≥ s¯2|Φ)
+ P
(
(σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ≥ Λ − (σ2N,k − σ2F,k)
∣∣σ˜20,k < s¯2,Φ)P (σ˜20,k < s¯2|Φ)
≤ P ((σ˜2N,k − σ˜2F,k)− (σ2N,k − σ2F,k) ≥ Λ − (σ2N,k − σ2F,k)∣∣σ˜20,k ≥ s¯2,Φ) (1− p¯) + p¯
≤ exp
(
−2s¯
4∨2 ln
(
2

)−min(nN , nF )(σ2N,k − σ2F,k)
2σ4∨20,k
)
(1− pK¯) + pK¯ , (22)
where the equality follows from conditioning and marginalizing, and (22) follows from the same two
observations as given in the proof of Theorem D.4.
We will now set s¯2 and upper bound P
(
σ˜20,k < s¯
2|Φ) ≤ pK¯ . Let s¯2 = σ20,k/K¯ for some K¯,K ≥ 1.
By an analysis identical to the one given in the proof of Theorem D.4 for (17):
P
(
σ˜20,k < s¯
2|Φ) = P(σ˜20,k − σ20,k < −K¯ − 1K¯ σ20,k∣∣∣Φ
)
≤ exp
(
−min(nN , nF )
2σ4∨20,k
(
K¯ − 1
K¯
σ20,k − 1
))
=: pK¯ . (23)
Now, the objective of (νk, )-matching is to upper bound (22) by νk/2. Applying a symmetric
argument to σ˜2F,k − σ˜2N,k and solving for dσ2k yields the result:
dσ2k = |σ
2
N,k − σ2F,k| ≤
2σ4∨20,k
min(nN , nF )
(
1
K
ln
(
2

)
− ln
(
2(1− pK¯)
νk − 2pK¯
))
.
Recall that this analysis requires that K ≥ 1 and that the right-hand side (specifically, the quantity
inside the parentheses) of the inequality above is positive. Taking the supremum over these two
conditions yields the result.
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Remark D.2. In both Theorems D.4 and D.5, the upper bounds on dβk and dσ2k shrink to 0 as
σ20,k → 0. Therefore, the feasible set reduces to the trivial solutions θN = θF when σ20,k = 0. When
this occurs, the only way that the SMP can meet regulation is by generating content ZF and natural
content ZN from the same models/distributions.
Remark D.3. By a similar logic to that explained in Remark D.2, if the SMP does not know σ2j,k but
knows their lower bounds, then satisfying Theorems D.4 and D.5 using the lower bounds instead of
σ2j,k also meets regulation since it gives a feasible set that is no larger than the original one.
Remark D.4. In both Theorems D.4 and D.5, there are requirements on γk and νk with respect to .
They imply that it is not possible for the SMP to reliably prevent -rejection when the rate  at which
the regulator chooses H˜ = H1 is large and the maximum rate νk or γk the SMP is allowed for the
outcome H˜ = H1 is small. For instance, meeting regulation is not possible when  > γk or  > νk.
D.5 Results & proofs for Section 4.1 (time-invariant linear setting)
We re-introduce the setup and notation for the time-invariant linear setting. In this setting, the user’s
feed Z is contains pieces of content zi = (yi,xi), where:
yi = β
>xi + ui, (2)
each zi corresponds to an individual piece of content with covariates xi ∈ Rr and outcome yi ∈ R
(e.g., yi is the sentiment associated with the opinion described by xi), the first component of every
xi is 1, and ui
i.i.d.∼ N (0, ρ2) is independent of the covariates xi. Suppose that |xi,k| > 0 for all
i ∈ [m] and k ∈ [r]. Let m be the number of items the user has observed, y = [y1, . . . , ym]> ∈ Rm,
X = [x1, . . . ,xm]
> ∈ Rm×r be the full-rank (non-random) design matrix,D = (X>X)−1 ∈ Rr×r,
Σ = ρ2Dkk ∈ Rr×r, and σ2k = Σkk. This setting is time-invariant because the system parameters
β ∈ Rr and ρ ∈ R, which are latent to the user, are fixed across time. Let the parameters governing the
natural (resp. filtered) feeds be βN , ρN (resp. βF , ρF ). Let θN = (βN,1, . . . , βN,r, σ
2
N,1, . . . , σ
2
N,r),
and let θ˜F be defined analogously. Recall that the regulator (and therefore the SMP) need only
consider the MVUE A+ for θ. Let the resulting estimates based on observations ZF and ZN be
denoted by θ˜F and θ˜N , respectively. Finally, in the notation of Section 3.4, let φN = (βN , DNρN),
let φF be defined analogously, and recall that Φ = (m,φN ,φF ).
In order to apply Theorems D.4 and D.5, the conditions (9) and (10) must hold, as shown next.
Lemma D.6. Consider (2). Then, the MVUE A+ gives estimates β˜j,k and σ˜2j,k for all j ∈ {N,F}
and k ∈ [r], such that:
β˜j,k ∼ N (βj,k, σ2j,k), (24)
σ˜2j,k − σ2j,k ∼ SG
(
2σ4j,k
m− r ,
2σ2j,k
m− r
)
. (25)
Proof. (24) is a well known result in inference for multiple linear regression [55]. Using OLS to
estimate the parameters β for multiple linear regression with Gaussian white noise gives β˜ = DX>y,
where β˜ ∼ N (β, ρ2D). Since X is full-rank, the OLS estimator is the MVUE [63] (which can also
be proven using the Gauss-Markov theorem [51]) with σ2j,k = ρ
2
jDj,kk, as defined above.
(25) follows from several observations. First, the variance ρ2 in (2) is estimated from the residuals of
the OLS estimates: yi− β˜>xi. The SSE estimator for the variance is given by ρ˜2 = 1m−r
∑m
i=1(yi−
β˜>xi)2. It is well-known that ρ˜2 is an unbiased estimator [42, 72]. Moreover, by Corollary 2.2. in
[11] or the Lehmann-Scheffé Theorem [51], it is also the MVUE in this setting. Second, it is well
known [75] that the sum of residuals ρ˜2 has a chi-square distribution with m− r degrees of freedom.
Specifically,
(m− r)ρ˜2i
ρ2i
∼ χ2(m− r).
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By Lemma D.2 and Property D.4,
ρ˜2i − ρ2j ∼ SG
(
2ρ4i
m− r ,
2ρ2i
m− r
)
.
Since σ˜2i,k = ρ
2
iDi,kk, we can apply Property D.5 to obtain the result.
Lemma D.6 allow Theorems D.4 and D.5 to be applied to the task of (α, )-matching (i.e., meeting
regulation) for (2) with the appropriate substitutions, as follows.
Theorem 2. Consider (2) and let γ ∈ [0, α]. Then, under Assumption 1, (α, )-regulation is met if,
for all k ∈ [r], βF,k satisfies:
|βF,k−βN,k| := dβk ≤ sup
{K:K≥1∩γ≥rSK(K)}
√
2σ20,k
(√
1
K
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− pK)
γ/r − 2pK
))
, (3)
and σ2F,k satisfies:
|σ2F,k−σ2N,k| := dσ2k ≤ sup{K:K≥1∩γ≤α−rSK¯(K)}
4σ2∨40,k
m− r
(
1
K
ln
(
2

)
− ln
(
2(1− pK¯)
(α− γ)/r − 2pK¯
))
.
Proof. This result is a direct application of Theorems D.4 and D.5 using Lemma D.6. Lemma
D.6 implies that these theorems can then be applied with the substitutions σ2j,k = ρ
2
iDi,kk and
nN = nF = (m− r)/2. To specialize the (γ, )-matching and (ν, )-matching of Theorems D.4 and
D.5 to (2), let ν = α − γ such that γ + ν = α, as desired. Lastly, to simplify the result, let each
γk = γ/r and νk = (1− γ)/r.
Remark D.5. The substitutions γk = γ/r and νk = (1 − γ)/r in Theorem D.5 (see proof above)
are not required. It may be advantageous to allow γk 6= γ` for k 6= ` ∈ [r] and similarly for νk.
Recall that γk and νk tune the strictness of regulation (e.g., a small γk means that βF,k must be very
close to βN,k to meet regulation). Therefore, setting γk, νk ≥ 0 to different values can be used by the
regulator to prioritize certain features over others.
Remark D.6. Since σ2j,k = ρ2iDi,kk is the product of two elements, the SMP has an additional degree
of freedom in choosing the generative models’ hyperparameters. For instance, the SMP can perfectly
match σ2N,k = σ
2
F,k even when ρ
2
F 6= ρ2N and D1,kk 6= D2,kk. Intuitively, this is what gives the SMP
the ability to achieve high reward or increase content diversity under regulation, as discussed in
Section 4.2.
Remark D.7. These bounds are of the same order as those expected of the MVUE, which state that
the distance decays as 1/
√
m.
Corollary 3. As m→∞, the feasible set contains only the trivial solutions Φˆ for which θN = θF .
Proof. Since the design matrix X is full-rank and |xi,k| > 0 for all i ∈ [m] and k ∈ [r], the
diagonal elements (X>X)kk =
∑m
i=1 x
2
i,k →∞ as the size of the dataset m→∞. Therefore, its
determinant |X>X| → ∞ as m→∞. By definition of the matrix inverse, the elements Dkk → 0
as m→∞. Specializing this result to j ∈ {N,F}, σ2j,k = ρ2jDj,kk → 0 as m→∞. By Theorem
2, the upper bounds on dβk and dσ2k approach 0, which means that the only way to meet regulation is
to set dβk , dσ2k = 0, concluding the proof.
Remark D.8. Intuitively, as more samples arrive, the estimates θ˜N , θ˜F steadily improve, making it
increasingly easy for the regulator to tell that learning divergence has occurred if θN 6= θF are not
equal. As such, the SMP can only choose θF = θN in the long term, which may impose a high cost
on the SMP.
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D.6 Results & proofs for Section 4.2 (time-varying linear setting)
We re-introduce the setup and notation for the more realistic, time-varying linear setting. Instead of
(2), suppose that:
β(t) = Aβ(t−1) + v(t), y = X(t)β(t) + u(t), (4)
where v(t) ∼N (0, Q) and u(t) ∼N (0, ρ2Im) are independent white processes [3]. We adopt the
same conventions as in Section 4.1 (also included below (2) above).
There are three main differences from Section 4.1 and Appendix D.5. The first is that the hyperpa-
rameters are now given by φ(t) = (β(t), D(t), ρ,Q). The second is that the MVUE estimates θ˜F and
θ˜N take a different form, as addressed in the next lemma. The third is that σ2k also takes a different
form, which is the result of the following lemma. Note that A is exogeneous.
Showing feasible set is non-trivial even under adversarial conditions. To contrast the time-
varying analysis against the time-invariant one, we wish to show that, even when the users have
extremely good estimators, the feasible set for the SMP is still non-trivial. To do so, we consider the
setting in which the user already has good knowledge of the system; specifically, the user knows
A, QN , QF , ρ2N , and ρ
2
F . As such, the user can deduce the variances σ
2
j,k for j ∈ {N,F} and all
k ∈ [r] perfectly, meaning that the SMP must set σ2N,k = σ2F,k. Therefore, the problem of hypothesis
matching reduces to (α, )-matching of βF to βN , and we focus on Theorem D.4.
As done in Section D.5, we must first show that (9) holds in order to apply Theorem D.4, leading to
the following result.
Lemma D.7. Consider (4) and suppose the user has perfect knowledge of A, QN , QF , ρ2N , and ρ2F .
Then, the MVUE A+ gives estimates β˜(t)j,k for j ∈ {N,F} and all k ∈ [r], such that:
β˜
(t)
j ∼ N (β(t)j , P (t)j ),
where, using the abbreviation of P (t)j to Pj,t and so on:
Pj,t = P¯j,t− P¯j,tX>t (XtP¯j,tX>t + ρ2j Im)−1XtP¯j,t, (26)
and P¯j,t = AjPj,t−1A>j +Qj .
Proof. The lemma follows from well known results for discrete-time Kalman filters [66, 13].
Corollary 4. Consider (4). Then, under Assumption 1, φ(t)F meets (α, )-regulation for a given m
and φ(t)N as long as φ
(t)
F satisfies (3) with γ = α, σ
2
N,k = σ
2
F,k = P
(t)
N,kk, pK = 0, and K = 1.
Proof. This result is a direct application Theorem D.4 and Lemma D.7.
In the setting of Lemma D.7 (see text above the lemma), the SMP must set σ2N,k = σ
2
F,k in order to
meet regulation. Therefore, the SMP need not devote “waste” any part of its regulation allowance
α on matching variances. In other words, we can set α = γ and ν = 0 in Theorems D.4 and
D.5. Since ν = 0, we restrict our attention to Theorem D.4. Applying Lemma D.7 gives that
σ2N,k = σ
2
F,k = P
(t)
N,kk. It remains to show that pK = 0 and K = 1, which follows from Remark D.1.
Briefly, this remark says that, since the user has perfect knowledge of the variances, the proof of
Theorem D.4 simplifies to the result with pK = 0 and K = 1.
Remark D.9. Since the provider must set (σ(t)N,k)2 = (σ(t)F,k)2 for all k ∈ [r], the provider must
equivalently set P (t)N,kk = P
(t)
F,kk for all t. By the same logic in Remark D.6, there are many ways the
provider can set hyperparameters such that this holds true. In addition, from Remark D.3, the size of
the feasible set is strongly dependent on σ2j,k, which is captured by P
(t)
j,kk. The larger this value, the
larger the allowable distance d
β
(t)
k
. As such, P (t)j,kk is the focus of the remaining results.
Proposition 5. If m <∞, there exists Φ(t) that meets regulation such that d(t)βk > 0, even as t→∞.
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Proof. In this proof, the subscript j is be removed for notational clarity. This proof uses on the
definition (26) of Pt in Lemma D.7. Firstly, note that when ρ2 = 0:
Pt,kk = e
>
k P¯tek − e>k P¯tX>t (XtP¯tX>t )−1XtP¯tek
= e>k P¯tek − e>k X†tXtP¯tX>t (XtP¯tX>t )−1XtP¯tek
= e>k P¯tek − e>k P¯tek
= 0. (27)
Secondly, for any vector w ∈ Rm and ρ2 > 0,
w>(XtP¯tX>t + ρ
2
uIm)w = w>(XtP¯tX>t )w + ρ2uw>w > w>XtP¯tX>t w,
and, likewise,
w>(XtP¯tX>t + ρ
2
uIm)−1w < w>(XtP¯tX>t )−1w.
Then, the diagonals of Pt can be characterized using the following analysis:
Pt,kk = e
>
k Ptek
= e>k P¯tek − e>k P¯tX>t (XtP¯tX>t + ρ2uIm)−1XtP¯tek
= e>k P¯tek −w>(XtP¯tX>t + ρ2uIm)−1w
> e>k P¯tek −w>(XtP¯tX>t )−1w (28)
= 0,
where (28) follows from (27) since (28) corresponds to when ρ2u = 0. By Corollary 4, this result
implies (σ(t)j,k)
2 > 0 and therefore, by Theorem D.4, that d(t)βk > 0 for all t as long as m is finite.
Remark D.10. This result shows that, as long as the system is time-varying (i.e., number of samples
per time step is finite), the feasible set always contains non-trivial solutions, even under a strong
estimator A+ and even in the long term. A non-trivial feasible set ensures the SMP always has some
flexibility in maximizing its reward.
Proposition 6. If the R(Φ) = R(dβ) such that the reward R a strictly concave function of dβ, then,
for every time step t, there exists Φ(t) such that the cost of regulation is arbitrarily small. If, in
addition, R(dβ) has a finite maximum, then there exists Φ(t) for which there is no cost of regulation.
Proof. In this proof, we drop the superscripts containing the time step t. The condition of this result
is that, aside from constants, R depends only on dβ.
When R(dβ) is strictly concave: Let the maximum attainable reward without regulation be denoted
by W ∗ := supdβ R(dβ). The proposition states that for any arbitrarily small cost of regulation c > 0
that the provider wishes to achieve, there exists Φ(t) such that the cost of regulation is at most c.
Since R is a strictly concave function of dβ, there exists d∗ < ∞ such that W ∗ − R(d∗) ≤ c. It
remains to show that dβ = d∗ is contained in the feasible set of (6).
Theorem D.4 provides a set of conditions for d∗ to be in the feasible set. We now establish that there
exists Φ such that these conditions hold. Let {d∗k}rk=1 be any choice of component distances such
that the total distance is d∗. For example, if we use the Euclidean distance between two-dimensional
vectors (i.e., r = 2) and d∗ = 5, then d∗1 = 3 and d
∗
2 = 4 yield the desired d
∗ = 5.
Then, we prove the result for each k ∈ [r]. Let K∗ ≥ 1 be the value of K that gives the supremum in
(3). Then, for this K∗, there are two conditions that must hold. The first condition, from Theorem
D.4, is:
d∗k ≤
√
2σ20,k
(√
1
K∗
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− pK∗)
γk − 2pK∗
))
, (29)
and the second condition is:
γk ≥ 2(1− pK∗)
( 
2
) 1
K∗
+ 2pK∗ . (30)
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To satisfy the first condition, let q upper bound pK∗ such that pK∗ ≤ q and the right-hand side of
(29) is positive when pK∗ = q (this condition is addressed when proving that the (30) holds). Then,
σ2N,k + σ
2
F,k = 2σ
2
N,k = 2σ
2
F,k can be set arbitrarily high such that this condition holds. Then, the first
condition (29) is satisfied by letting σ20,k = σ¯
2
0,k, where:
σ¯20,k =
(d∗k)
2
2
(√
1
K∗
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− q)
γk − 2q
))−2
. (31)
To meet the second condition (30): Since pK ≤ q, it suffices to show that:
γk ≥ 2(1− q)
( 
2
) 1
K∗
+ 2q. (32)
Recall that  and γ are set by the regulator and that, by Remark D.4, the regulator must set γ
large enough in order for the regulation to be feasible. Then, as long as the regulation is feasible,
ζ = γ − 2r (/2) 1K∗ > 0. Let ζk = ζ/r. Then, (32) holds true when:
γk ≥ ζk + 2 (/2)
1
K∗ . (33)
Then, (33) holds when:
ζk + 2 (/2)
1
K∗ ≥ 2(1− q)
( 
2
) 1
K∗
+ 2q,
or alternatively when:
pK ≤ q ≤ ζk
2− 2(/2)1/K∗ .
From the definition of pK∗ , it remains to show that:
pK∗ := exp
(
−min(nF , nN)
2σ2∨40,k
(
K − 1
K
σ20,k − 1
))
≤ ζk
2− 2(/2)1/K∗ .
This relationship holds for large enough nN and nF (i.e., large enough m). For instance, let:
n1, n2 ≥
(
2σ¯2∨40,k K
∗
σ¯20,k(K
∗ − 1)−K∗
)
ln
(
2− 2(/2)1/K∗
ζk
)
. (34)
We have shown that there exist choices of parameters σ2N,k, σ
2
F,k and nN , nF such that both (29) and
(30) are satisfied. Specifically, for any Φ such that σ2N,k, σ
2
F,k, nN , and nF simultaneously satisfy (31)
and (34), d∗ is contained in the feasible set. The only remaining issue is whether or not σ2j,k and nj
can be set independently. This is indeed the case in the time-varying system (4). Intuitively, as long
as σ2j,k is a function of at least two independent hyperparameters, for any choice of nj , the variances
σ2j,k can be tuned to the desired value using the other hyperparameters. In (4), σ
2
j,k is also a function
of the design matrix Xj and the noise ρ2j , which finishes this portion of the proof.
When R(dβ) is strictly concave and finite-maximum: Since R(dβ) has a finite maximum, simply
choose d∗ < ∞ such that d∗ := arg maxdβ R(dβ) and W ∗ = R(d∗) (i.e., c = 0). Then, repeat
precisely the same proof as that given above.
Remark D.11. In many cases, R satisfies these conditions. For instance, if R tracks the number of
times a user purchases an advertised product, there is a tradeoff between showing products that are
new to the user (high dβ) and those that are related to the user’s interests (low dβ). Such a relation
implies a strictly concave, finite-maximum R(dβ). Intuitively, the low- (or zero-) cost solution in
Proposition 6 exists when ZN is sufficiently diverse. However, this condition is not strictly necessary,
as discussed next.
Remark D.12. The conditions in Proposition 6 are stricter than necessary. In the proof of Proposition
6, it clear that as long as the conditions in the proof hold, then R can be a function of other
hyperparameters in Φˆ in addition to dβ.
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Remark D.13. Proposition 5 showed that, even when the observer has perfect knowledge of A, Q,
and ρ2, there still exists a d(t)βk > 0 that meets regulation at every time step t as long as the world is
time-varying (i.e., m <∞). The scenario in which the user has perfect knowledge of A, Q, and ρ2 is
not unrealistic in the long-term since, as t→∞, it is possible for the user to learn these deterministic
quantities perfect. However, in the scenario we examined, the SMP was restricted to d(t)
σ2k
= 0. In the
next result, we show that, when Q and ρ2 are time-varying and unknown, they are impossible to learn
with total certainty, which allows d(t)
σ2k
> 0 for all t.
Lemma 7. Suppose that QN , QF , ρ2N , and ρ2F in (4) are also time-varying and unknown [20], and let
the reward functionR satsify the same conditions as in Proposition 6. Then, at least one minimum-cost
filtered feed Z(t)F,∗ has content diversity that is strictly greater than that of Z
(t)
N .
Proof. In this proof, we consider the setting in which Q(t), and (ρ(t))2 are time-varying and unknown.
As before we focus on the MVUE. Since the user does not know Q(t) or (ρ(t))2 and cannot learn them
with complete certainty because they are time-varying, the user must utilize tools to check whether
her estimates for Q(t) or (ρ(t))2 are consistent with her observations. In the literature, this problem is
well-studied and known as model mismatch or filter inconsistency [61]. [20] proves that, in order to
maintain an unbiased estimator, the user must perform a procedure (that is equivalent to hypothesis
testing). Therefore, since the MVUE is unbiased, the MVUE must employ this procedure as well.
The result in [20] can be summarized as follows. There exists a range [a(t)k , b
(t)
k ] where a
(t)
k < b
(t)
k
and (σ(t)N,k)2 ∈ (a(t)k , b(t)k ) such that (σ(t)F,k)2 can take values in this range without causing -rejection.
In other words, there exists a d(t)
σ2k
> 0 that meets regulation for all t. Recall from Definition 6 that
increasing variance σ2F,k is equivalent to increasing content diversity of ZF because the information
entropy of a Gaussian random variable is proportional to its variance. By Theorem D.4, the SMP can
increase d(t)βk by increasing σ
2
F,k, and therefore, content diversity. By the same logic in the proof of
Proposition 6, the SMP is incentivized to do so because raising the upper bound on d(t)βk leads to a
higher reward R.
Remark D.14. Intuitively, this occurs because a changing world adds uncertainty, making it less
likely for the user to develop the strong, long-lasting beliefs from a filtered feed that result in learning
divergence. The result can effectively be summarized as: the SMP under regulation is naturally
incentivized to increase content diversity of Z(t)F relative to Z
(t)
N because doing so increases the SMP’s
reward (i.e., profit).
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E Interpreting the main results (Section 4)
E.1 Summary of results
Section 3 and Appendix C.2 propose a data-driven regulatory procedure that, by construction, satisfies
two of the regulation desiderata. In particular, the proposed regulation is user-driven and context-
dependent. The remainder of the paper sought to show that there are conditions under which the
regulation satisfies the remaining two desiderata, thereby showing the proposed regulation can meet
all four desiderata simultaneously.
In Section 4 and Appendix D, we apply the regulatory framework to linear dynamical systems
and show that there are conditions under which the proposed regulation is low-cost and that the
regulation naturally incentivizes the SMP to increase content diversity. This result is interesting for
three reasons. First, the regulation’s only objective is to limit the effect of AF on user learning and
decision-making relative to a natural reference. It is carefully designed to also meet certain practical
constraints and desirable properties of online governance. However, it does not set out to diversify
content, and yet one consistent outcome of the regulation is that it encourages higher content diversity.
Second, the fact that the regulation can be low cost under reasonable conditions means that it is in
the SMP’s financial interest to adopt regulation since doing so allows them to demonstrate that they
are being socially responsible while making a minimal financial sacrifice. This result implies the
regulation-reward tradeoff does not necessarily hold. Third, under certain conditions, the regulation
actually incentivizes the SMP to increase content diversity, meaning that the regulation aligns social
and financial interests.
A quick review of our main results are:
• The cost of regulation is high when the user can learn θN and θF with high certainty.
• An impossibility result that, in the time-invariant linear setting, the feasible set shrinks to only
trivial solutions in the long term. Specifically, the filtered content must have (nearly) identical
distributional characteristics to those of the natural content in order to meet regulation at
t→∞, meaning that the long-term cost of regulation is high.
• The positive result that, in the time-varying linear setting, there always exist non-trivial
solutions. In particular, there are conditions under which the cost of regulation is low or even
zero. Moreover, in such settings, the SMP is incentivized to increase content diversity because
doing so increases its reward.
We conclude that there are conditions under which the regulation satisfies all four regulation desiderata
simultaneously, such that it is user-driven, context-dependent, low-cost, and diversity-inducing.
While the linear dynamical system in Section 4 and Appendix D is simple and utilized in the main
results for illustrative purposes, it is representative of much broader setting, cf. linear approximation
via the kernel trick [65] and universality of the Gaussian distribution [39, 35].
E.2 High cost of regulation in time-invariant linear setting (Section 4.1)
We first present the results of Sections 4.1 and D.5, which analyze the proposed regulation in the
time-invariant linear setting. Then, we provide a brief interpretation of the main results.
Theorem 2. Consider (2) and let γ ∈ [0, α]. Then, under Assumption 1, (α, )-regulation is met if,
for all k ∈ [r], βF,k satisfies:
|βF,k−βN,k| := dβk ≤ sup
{K:K≥1∩γ≥rSK(K)}
√
2σ20,k
(√
1
K
ln
(
2

)
−
√
ln
(
2(1− pK)
γ/r − 2pK
))
,
and σ2F,k satisfies:
|σ2F,k−σ2N,k| := dσ2k ≤ sup{K:K≥1∩γ≤α−rSK¯(K)}
4σ2∨40,k
m− r
(
1
K
ln
(
2

)
− ln
(
2(1− pK¯)
(α− γ)/r − 2pK¯
))
.
Corollary 3. As m→∞, the feasible set contains only the trivial solutions Φˆ for which θN = θF .
Interpreting the results: Recall that a large feasible set over which the SMP can maximize its
reward leads to a lower cost of regulation. From the results, we find that:
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• Meeting regulation restricts the feasible set by upper bounding the distances dβk and dσ2k .• The feasible set grows when the regulator gives the SMP more allowance (higher α) or makes
the definition of learning divergence more strict (lower ).
• The SMP can further lower cost by adding uncertainty (i.e., increasing σ2F,k). Since σ2F,k =
ρ2FDF,kk, adding uncertainty can be done by curating the content to have high noise ρ
2
F relative
to the covariate spread 1/DF,kk (i.e., increasing content diversity).
• There are always many feasible solutions since σ2F,k is a product of two hyperparameters.• By Corollary 3, the only way to meet regulation in the long term is to set θN = θF . Unless
this solution is optimal, this means regulation comes at a high-cost in the time-invariant case.
These results show that one should not study the time-invariant case for two reasons. First, it is not
a realistic representation of the world. Second, because it is not realistic, one can draw incorrect
conclusions from it: namely that regulation imposes a high cost on the SMP.
E.3 Aligning reward and content diversity in time-varying linear setting (Section 4.2)
In Section 4.2 and Appendix D.6, we study the more realistic, time-varying setting. We first review
the main results, then provide a brief interpretation.
Corollary 4. Consider (4). Then, under Assumption 1, φ(t)F meets (α, )-regulation for a given m
and φ(t)N as long as φ
(t)
F satisfies (3) with γ = α, σ
2
N,k = σ
2
F,k = P
(t)
N,kk, pK = 0, and K = 1.
Proposition 5. If m <∞, there exists Φ(t) that meets regulation such that d(t)βk > 0, even as t→∞.
Proposition 6. If the R(Φ) = R(dβ) such that the reward R a strictly concave function of dβ, then,
for every time step t, there exists Φ(t) such that the cost of regulation is arbitrarily small. If, in
addition, R(dβ) has a finite maximum, then there exists Φ(t) for which there is no cost of regulation.
Lemma 7. Suppose that QN , QF , ρ2N , and ρ2F in (4) are time-varying and latent to the user [20],
and let the reward function R satsify the same conditions as in Proposition 6. Then, at least one
minimum-cost filtered feed Z(t)F,∗ has content diversity that is strictly greater than that of Z
(t)
N .
Interpreting the results: In the time-varying linear setting, we find that:
• The feasible set is large when α is large,  is small, or the world evolves quickly.
• By Proposition 5, the feasible set always contains non-trivial solutions even in the long term,
which gives the SMP options to choose from when maximizing reward. Generally, a larger
feasible set implies a higher reward.
• In fact, by Proposition 6, there are conditions under which the cost of regulation is arbitrarily
low or zero. Intuitively, this occurs because regulation places some restrictions but leaves
several degrees of freedom that allow the SMP to find a profitable solution.
• By Lemma 7, there are conditions under which the SMP is naturally incentivized to increase
content diversity in order to lower costs. This result implies that the regulation aligns social
and financial interests.
As a final note, the conditions under which the low-cost and diversity results hold true are not
unreasonable. For instance, Lemma 7, which gives the most powerful result, actually extends
Proposition 6 to a more realistic setting. That is, Lemma 7 corresponds to a world in which the
underlying generative models are unknown and time-varying. Moreover, the conditions on the reward
function R are more strict than necessary; there are other types of reward functions for which the
results hold true. Even so, a reward function that is strictly concave in dβ is a flexible and reasonable
supposition. It implies that the reward balances two objectives: showing content that is similar to
content with which the user already interacts and showing the user new content.
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F Illustrative examples
In this section, we review and provide additional details for the example in Section 5 (Fig. 3). Before
doing so, we present two additional simulations that provide helpful intuitions. The code used to
generate these simulations are included in Appendix G.
F.1 Simulation 1: Effect of hyperparameters on user learning and uncertainty
(a) Control (b) Low m (c) High noise ρ2 (d) Low spread in x
Figure F.1: The effect of hyperparameters Φ on user learning when the underlying model is linear. The
green points represent data/content shown to the user, where x is the feature and y is the outcome. The
true linear relationship is given by the black line. The grey lines are drawn from the distribution/belief
over possible models the user learns after observing the data. The larger the spread of the grey lines,
the less certain the user is about her learned model. (a) gives the control experiment. The remaining
plots change one hyperparameter each. As expected, the user’s certainty decreases when the number
of points decreases, the system noise increases, or the features have lower spread.
The main results showed that introducing uncertainty (increasing σ2F,k) plays a helpful role in
increasing the size of the feasible set. (In fact, one mechanism for adding uncertainty is increasing
content diversity.) Therefore, the SMP can grow its feasible set and increase its reward is by ensuring
that there is sufficient uncertainty associated with the filtered feed. The following experiment
illustrates how the SMP’s choice of hyperparameters Φ affects user learning when the underlying
model is linear. In particular, we focus on what mechanisms allow the SMP to add uncertainty.
This simulation is illustrated in Fig. F.1. Suppose that, from the content, the user’s implicit objective
is to learn a simple linear relationship between feature x and outcome y. That is, each piece of content
corresponds to a (x, y) pair, and the user implicitly learns a set of internal models, each associated
with a level of confidence she assigns to that model, by regressing on the content. In Fig. F.1, each
green dot corresponds to a piece of content. The black line represents the true linear model that
generated the green dots (i.e., generated the feed).
Because the observations are noisy, the user is not sure of any given model, but has a belief (i.e.,
distribution) over possible models. In Fig. F.1, this uncertainty is visualized using the grey lines.
After observing the feed (green dots), the user’s belief in the true underlying linear model is given
by some distribution. Suppose the user uses OLS to estimate the linear model. Then, the grey lines
are drawn from the user’s belief/distribution over possible models. The larger the spread of the grey
lines, the less certain the user is about her learned model.
Fig. F.1a gives the control experiment. The remaining plots change one hyperparameter each. Fig.
F.1b reduces the number of data points m, F.1c increases system noise, and F.1d lowers the spread of
feature x. The user’s certainty decreases (i.e., the spread of the grey lines grows) when the number
of points is small, the system noise is high, or the features have low spread. Recall that the SMP
can lower his cost of regulation by increasing the upper bound on dβk or dσ2k , which can be done by
increasing σ2F,k subject to the regulation strictness. In this experiment, σ
2
F,k is equivalent to making
sure the spread of the grey lines is sufficiently large. This experiment confirms that, one way that
the SMP can meet regulation at low cost is by, for any given topic, providing diverse content. This
relationship is confirmed in Simulation 3 (Section F.3).
F.2 Simulation 2: Uncertainty’s role in lowering the cost of regulation
Fig. F.2 visualizes the intuition behind some of our main results. This experiment focuses on the
time-varying linear setting leading to the result in Proposition 6. As such, suppose that σ2N,k = σ
2
F,k
for all k ∈ [r]. Then, we study how regulation affects the feasible set for φF and how it affects the
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(a) Reward function c = 2 (b) Feasible region for dβ1 (c) Effect of hyperparameters
(d) Reward v. size of feasible set (e) Cost of regulation (f) Reward v. model uncertainty
Figure F.2: Illustration of main results. This experiment focuses on the results leading to Proposition
6. In this setting, σ2F,k = σ
2
N,k and α = γ. Suppose there are two advertisements that provide
different rewards. (a) visualizes an example of the strictly concave, finite-maximum reward function
R(dβ) that is used for the experiments, where the peak occurs at dβ = d∗. The total reward is
the sum of rewards from both advertisements. (d) shows the relationship between the size of the
feasible set for each advertisement and the total reward. (b) visualizes the feasible region for dβ1 as
regulation becomes more strict (i.e., → α, which is normalized on a 0 to 1 scale). In (e), the plots
are normalized such that the reward without regulation for each choice of d∗ is 1. The greater the
distance between a curve and the black line, the larger the cost of regulation. (c) illustrates that there
are infinite choices of Φ, specifically the noise variance ρ2F and the feature spread in X , that produce
the same parameter variance σ2F . (f) plots the relationship between reward and the user’s uncertainty
in her learned model (as captured by parameter variance σ2F ).
cost of regulation depending on the SMP’s choice of hyperparameters φF given φN and m. One
reason we study this setting is because it is time-varying and examines the system behavior in the
long term. A second reason is that the regulator and SMP are generally most interested in βF relative
to βN since these parameters capture the differences between what the filtered and natural feeds show
(or “teach”). More details on this setting can be found in Appendix D.6.
For this experiment, we propose a strictly concave, finite-maximum reward function shown in Fig.
F.2a. This type of reward function is motivated in 4.2 and Appendix D.6. This type of reward
function is considered in Proposition 6, which shows that there are conditions under which the cost
of regulation is arbitrarily low or zero. For this experiment, the reward function is additive:
R(dβ) = R1(dβ1) +R2(dβ2),
where:
R1(dβ1) =
1
4
((d∗)2 − (dβ1 − d∗)2),
R2(dβ1) =
3
4
((d∗)2 − (dβ2 − d∗)2).
In this reward function, d∗ denotes the dβ value at which the reward peaks. In the remaining plots,
unless otherwise stated, d∗ = 1, α = 0.1, and σ2F = 1.
As shown in Fig. F.2b, the feasible set shrinks as regulation becomes more strict. The y-axis in Fig.
F.2b plots the feasible region for βN,1−βF,1, which represents the difference in the underlying models
generating advertisement 1. The x-axis tracks the strictness of regulation, which is given by 2/α for
α = 0.1 and  = [0.001, 0.002, . . . , 0.050]. This expression is derived from the fact that, since our
analysis is symmetric, α is split evenly across the two advertisements. Therefore, α/2 is allocated to
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each advertisement, and regulation is only feasible when  does not exceed this value. As expected,
the feasible region shrinks as regulation becomes more strict. This means that the underlying models
for the natural and filtered content must be closer as regulation becomes increasingly strict. In this
plot only, σ2F = 5.4, but the trend is the same for all values of σ
2
F .
However, Fig. F.2d shows that the feasible set need not be infinitely large. In fact, as stated in
Proposition 6, since the reward function is strictly concave and has a finite maximum, there are
there exist large enough dβk such that there is no cost to regulation (where the yellow and purple
reward plateau). Note that the rewards in both Fig. F.2d and F.2e have been normalized such that
the maximum attainable reward is 1. Fig. F.2e visualizes the cost of regulation for different values
of d∗. The y-axis gives the SMP’s normalized reward (i.e., the reward he receives after solving the
optimization (6) under the given system parameters). The x-axis tracks the strictness of regulation
(same definition as that for Fig. F.2b). Intuitively, small values of d∗ produce reward functions
that peak at small values of dβk . The smaller d
∗ is, the easier it is for the SMP to meet regulation.
Confirming this intuition, the curves with small values of d∗ (e.g., the red curve) are closer to the
maximum reward (represented by the black line) than those with large values of d∗. In addition, as
expected, the normalized reward decreases as regulation becomes increasingly strict and approaches
infeasibility (when strictness of regulation is above 1).
Fig. F.2c visualizes the observation in Remark D.6. Recall that, in this experiment, the noise
parameters for the natural and filtered content are set to be equal: σ2N = σ
2
F . While this assumption
may seem restrictive, there are usually several hyperparameters that control each σ2j for j ∈ {N,F}.
For instance, in the time-invariant linear Gaussian setting, σ2F = ρ
2
FDF,kk. For illustrative purposes
only, Fig. F.2c briefly switches to the time-invariant setting to show that there are infinite choices of
hyperparameters—specifically, noise variance ρ2F and DF,kk—that satisfy the requirement σ
2
N = σ
2
F .
Lastly, Fig. F.2f verifies that meeting regulation—and therefore achieving high reward—is easier
when Φ introduces more uncertainty into the data and learned models. The y-axis gives the normalized
reward, and the x-axis tracks σ2F . As expected, as the SMP introduces more uncertainty into the
system, the reward increases; it always reaches the maximum reward, except when  = α/2, at which
point the feasible region for dβk reduces to the trivial solution dβk = 0 (see Fig. F.2d), which means
that the incurred reward is 0 (see Fig. F.2a).
F.3 Simulation 3: How regulation can align social and financial interests (Fig. 3)
Lastly, we review and provide additional details for the simulation presented in Fig. 3. This simulation
summarizes the findings in Section 4.2, including Lemma 7. It illustrates how the SMP can lower
cost by increasing content diversity in the time-varying LGS. For this section only, we abbreviate ZN
to N and ZF to F . Details for this simulation are included in the code in Appendix G.
Consider (4). Now, consider the additional feature of the system that Q(t) and ρ(t) are also time-
varying (as done in Lemma 7). Note that this feature makes the analysis more realistic. To simplify
the visualization, suppose r = 1, such that y(t)i = β
(t) + u(t)i and u
(t)
i ∼ N (0, (ρ(t))2). Fig. 3a
visualizes examples of belief that the MVUE user w would learn for β˜(t) based on the SMP’s choice
of feed. We consider two settings. Fig. 3b corresponds to the control setting with N1, and Fig. 3c
corresponds to a more diverse N2 and more quickly varying world. Then, we examine different
options for the filtered feed F , which vary in their means (i.e., what value the user learns) and/or their
spread (i.e., the user’s confidence in the value she learns).
Fig. 3b and 3c compare the cost of regulation and content diversity in the two settings. Both mark the
locations of the feeds in Fig. 3a in the cost-diversity plane. The color map (for which the scale is
on the far right) corresponds to regulations with different levels of strictness (i.e., regulations with
different α and ). Strict regulations only allow choices in the immediate neighborhood of N while
looser regulations give larger feasible sets. Each level curve marks the boundaries of the feasible set
for a specific choice of regulation (i.e., choice of α and ).
Two key observations follow. First, as they move away from the left-hand side, the level curves
decrease, eventually reaching a minimum. As such, it is possible for the SMP to decrease its cost by
increasing content diversity subject to the boundaries imposed by the regulation. This result illustrates
how the proposed regulation aligns social and financial interests. Second, the level curves in Fig. 3b
and 3c correspond to the same regulations, but the minimums of those in Fig 3c are lower and farther
to the right. Therefore, the feasible sets in the second setting are larger, allowing for lower costs and
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Figure 3: Illustrating regulation’s effect on user learning, content diversity, and the SMP’s reward.
This simple example focuses on the time-varying linear setting of Section 4.2 and Appendix D.6.
(a) shows examples of the user’s learned posteriors for depending on the SMP’s choice of feed at
time t. (b) and (c) show how this choice affects cost and content diversity. The color map indicates
different choices of regulation, from strict (close to N ) to loose. Each level curve corresponds to a
specific regulation (i.e., α and ). (b) and (c) compare the ability of the SMP to achieve low cost and
high content diversity under different settings. (b) represents the control while (c) represents a more
quickly changing world with a more diverse natural feed. As shown, the SMP can its lower cost by
increasing the content diversity of F relative to N . Comparing (b) and (c) shows that, under a given
regulation, the cost is lower when the world changes quickly and/or the natural reference is diverse.
higher content diversity under the same regulation. This observation confirms that, under the same
regulation, reward and diversity are greater when N is diverse and the user’s learned beliefs have
sufficiently high uncertainty. As discussed below Lemma 7, it is possible for the SMP to realize the
second setting in the long term.
The choice of reward function in this simulation is:
R = d∗ − |dβ − d∗|,
where d∗ = 2.5. This simple choice of reward function is concave and has a finite-maximum. This
particular choice of reward function works well for visualization purposes.
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G Simulation code
The code below is used to run the simulations and generate the figures in Section 5 and Appendix F.
The executables are given in Appendix G.1, and all helper functions are given in Appendix G.2. Fig.
F.1 and F.2 are generated using MATLAB. Fig. 3 is generated in a Jupyter notebook.
G.1 MATLAB executables
In this section, we provide the executables. They are ordered such that the programming beginning
with S0 should be run first, following by S1, and so on.
The following is the code for S0_STARTUP.m.
addpath(genpath(’utils’))
addpath(genpath(’data’))
The following is the code for S1_RUN_TESTS.m, which is used to generate the results in Fig. F.2.
% SUMMARY: linear setting , assumptions , and last setting in which we
assume
% knowledge of the noise parameters.
clear all
close all
%% SETTING UP
d = 2; % number of features
R_k = [0.25 ,0.75]; % rewards per feature
% Parameters to sweep over
sig0_k = repmat ((1:0.1:10) ’,1,d); % noise variance in linear setting
epsilon_arr = 0.001:0.001:0.05; % for epsilon -rejection
alpha_arr = 0.05:0.05:0.25; % for alpha -epislon matching
cfac_arr = [0.125 ,0.25 ,0.5 ,1 ,2]; % for peak of reward function
n_sig0 = size(sig0_k ,1); % number of variances to sweep over
n_eps = length(epsilon_arr); % number of epsilons to sweep over
n_alpha = length(alpha_arr); % number of alphas to sweep over
n_cfac = length(cfac_arr); % number of c-values to sweep over
%% CREATING ARRAYS TO STORE RESULTS
R_res = zeros(n_eps ,n_alpha ,n_cfac ,n_sig0);
beta_gamma_res = zeros(n_eps ,n_alpha ,n_cfac ,n_sig0 ,2*d);
R_noreg_res = zeros(n_eps ,n_alpha ,n_cfac ,n_sig0);
beta_gamma_noreg_res = zeros(n_eps ,n_alpha ,n_cfac ,n_sig0 ,2*d);
maxdev_beta = zeros(n_eps ,n_alpha ,n_cfac ,n_sig0 ,d);
%% RUNNING TESTS
for i=1: n_eps
for j=1: n_alpha
for k=1: n_cfac
for l=1: n_sig0
[R_res(i,j,k,l), ...
beta_gamma_res(i,j,k,l,:), ...
R_noreg_res(i,j,k,l), ...
beta_gamma_noreg_res(i,j,k,l,:), ...
maxdev_beta(i,j,k,l,:)] = ...
run_test(d,alpha_arr(j),epsilon_arr(i), ...
sig0_k(l,:),R_k ,cfac_arr(k));
end
end
end
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end
%% SAVING DATA
save(sprintf(’data/% d_dimensions_R_k_%s.mat’, ...
d,regexprep(mat2str(R_k), ’ +’, ’_’)))
The following is the code for S2_PLOT_LIN_SETTINGS.m, which generates Fig. F.1.
clear all
close all
%% SETTING UP
betas = [1 ,0.5]; % true line parameters
% Plotting configuration
config = {};
config.gray_clr = [99 101 105]/255;
config.green_clr = [72 162 63]/255;
config.fnt_size = 20;
config.mkr_size = 20;
config.alpha = 0.075;
config.M = 100;
config.line_width = 3;
%% LINEAR PLOTS (control)
N = 50; % number of data points
noise_var = 0.1; % additive noise variance
x_spread_var = 2; % Gaussian feature spread (variance)
f1 = plot_lin_result(N,noise_var ,x_spread_var ,betas ,config);
%% LINEAR PLOTS (decrease N)
N = 5;
noise_var = 0.1;
x_spread_var = 2;
f2 = plot_lin_result(N,noise_var ,x_spread_var ,betas ,config);
%% LINEAR PLOTS (decrease covariate spread)
N = 50;
noise_var = 0.1;
x_spread_var = 0.1;
f3 = plot_lin_result(N,noise_var ,x_spread_var ,betas ,config);
%% LINEAR PLOTS (increase noise variance)
N = 50;
noise_var = 1;
x_spread_var = 3;
f4 = plot_lin_result(N,noise_var ,x_spread_var ,betas ,config);
The following is the code for S3_PLOT_MAIN_RESULTS.m, which generates Fig. F.2.
clear all
close all
%% LOAD DATA
load(’data/2 _dimensions_R_k_ [0.25_0 .75]. mat’)
%% SETTING UP
blue_clr = [0 169 224]/255;
green_clr = [72 162 63]/255;
yellow_clr = [242 169 0]/255;
purple_clr = [113 80 145]/255;
gray_clr = [99 101 105]/255;
red_clr = [183 49 44]/255;
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clr_1 = blue_clr;
clr_2 = red_clr;
alpha = 0.2;
fnt_size = 16;
line_width = 4;
alph_ind = 2;
c_ind = 4;
%% PLOT REWARD FUNCTION (CONCAVE)
x = 0:0.01:5;
y1 = -R_objfunx(x,1,R_k(1) ,2,length(x));
y2 = -R_objfunx(x,1,R_k(2) ,2,length(x));
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
plot(x,y1,’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’Color’,yellow_clr)
hold on
plot(x,y2,’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’Color’,purple_clr)
hold on
plot(x,zeros(length(x)),’k--’)
hold off
xlabel(’d_\beta’)
ylabel(’reward function ’)
legend(’Advertisement 1 (R_1 = 0.25) ’, ...
’Advertisement 2 (R_2 = 0.75)’, ...
’Location ’,’southwest ’)
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’),’FontSize ’,fnt_size)
saveas(f,’data/simul_plots_reward_v_dbeta.png’)
%% PLOT SIZE FEASIBLE REGION V STRICTNESS (through epsilon)
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
sig0_ind = 45;
x = (epsilon_arr)/( alpha_arr(alph_ind)/2);
plot_maxdev = maxdev_beta (:,alph_ind ,c_ind ,sig0_ind ,2);
y = zeros(length(epsilon_arr) ,1);
for i=1:5
errorbar(x,y,plot_maxdev ,’*’, ...
’LineWidth ’,line_width -2.5,’Color’,green_clr)
hold on
end
hold off
xlabel(’strictness of regulation ’)
ylabel(’feasible region of d_\beta’)
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’),’FontSize ’,fnt_size)
saveas(f,’data/simul_plots_feas_v_strict.png’)
%% PLOT REWARD V SIZE OF FEASIBLE SET
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
sig0_ind = 1;
x = (epsilon_arr)/( alpha_arr(alph_ind)/2);
plot(maxdev_beta (1:end ,alph_ind ,c_ind ,sig0_ind ,1), ...
-R_res (1:end ,alph_ind ,c_ind ,sig0_ind),’-’, ...
’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’Color ’,yellow_clr)
hold on
plot(maxdev_beta (1:end ,alph_ind ,c_ind ,sig0_ind ,2), ...
-R_res (1:end ,alph_ind ,c_ind ,sig0_ind),’-’, ...
’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’Color ’,purple_clr)
legend(’Advertisement 1’,’Advertisement 2’,’Location ’,’southeast ’)
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xlabel(’maximum d_\beta (as regulation strictness decreases)’)
ylabel(’Reward from advertisement ’)
ylim ([0.45 ,1])
xlim ([0 ,1.2])
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’),’FontSize ’,fnt_size)
saveas(f,’data/simul_plots_reward_v_feas.png’)
%% PLOT EFFECT OF CONCAVITY/PEAK ON REWARD
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
x = (epsilon_arr)/( alpha_arr(alph_ind)/2);
plot(x,ones(length(epsilon_arr) ,1), ...
’DisplayName ’,’without regulation ’,’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’Color ’,
’k’)
hold on
for k=1: n_cfac
scal_factor = -min(R_noreg_res (:,alph_ind ,k,sig0_ind));
plot(x,-R_res(:,alph_ind ,k,sig0_ind)/scal_factor , ...
’DisplayName ’,sprintf(’with regulation (d* = %.2f)’,cfac_arr(k)
), ...
’LineWidth ’,line_width);
end
xlabel(’strictness of regulation ’)
ylabel(’normalized reward ’)
ylim ([0 ,1.05])
hold off
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’),’FontSize ’,fnt_size)
legend(’Location ’,’southwest ’,’FontSize ’,fnt_size - 4)
saveas(f,’data/simul_plots_2_reward_v_strict.png’)
%% PLOT EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON REWARD
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
eps_inds = [40 ,45 ,48 ,49 ,50];
clr = gray_clr;
for i=1: length(eps_inds)
min_R = min(R_res(eps_inds(i),alph_ind ,c_ind ,:));
if (abs(min_R) < 1e-8)
min_R = 1;
end
plot(squeeze(sig0_k (:,1)), ...
squeeze(R_res(eps_inds(i),alph_ind ,c_ind ,:))/min_R , ...
’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’DisplayName ’, ...
sprintf(’%s = %.3f’,’\epsilon ’,epsilon_arr(eps_inds(i))))
hold on
end
legend(’Location ’,’southeast ’)
hold off
xlabel(’\sigma_F ^2’)
xlim ([1 ,10])
ylabel(’normalized reward ’)
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’),’FontSize ’,fnt_size)
saveas(f,’data/simul_plots_reward_v_sigma.png’)
%% PLOT HYPERPARAMETERS CHOICES FOR DESIRED VARIANCE
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
sig_i_sq_vals = 1:2:10;
n_sig_i = length(sig_i_sq_vals);
C_i = 1:0.1:10;
for i=1: n_sig_i
sig_u_i_sq = sig_i_sq_vals(i)./C_i;
plot(C_i ,sig_u_i_sq , ...
’LineWidth ’,line_width ,’DisplayName ’, ...
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sprintf(’%s = %d’,’\sigma_F ^2’,sig_i_sq_vals(i)))
hold on
end
legend(’Location ’,’northeast ’)
xlabel(’feature spread ’)
xlim ([1 ,10])
ylabel(’noise variance ’)
hold off
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’),’FontSize ’,fnt_size)
saveas(f,’data/simul_plots_hyperparameters_uncertainty.png’)
G.2 MATLAB utility functions
These following files were placed in a folder utils, which belongs in the same folder in which the
executable programs are contained.
The following code is the code for R_objfunx.m, which represents the reward function R tested in
Section F.2 and displayed in Fig. F.2.
function R = R_objfunx(beta_gamma_k ,sig0_k ,R_k ,c,d)
if (nargin < 5)
d = length(beta_gamma_k)/2;
R = -sum(dot(c^2-( beta_gamma_k (1:d) - c).^2,R_k));
else
R = -(c^2-( beta_gamma_k (1:d) - c).^2)*(R_k);
end
The following code is the code for R_constraint.m, which gives the constraints forR under regulation
as tested in Section F.2.
function [c,ceq] = R_constraint(beta_gamma_k ,epsilon ,gamma ,sig0_k)
d = length(beta_gamma_k)/2;
Delta_eps = sig0_k .^2*( norminv (1 - epsilon /2));
dev_gamma = sig0_k .^2.* norminv (1 - beta_gamma_k(d+1:end)/2);
maxdev_beta_k = abs(Delta_eps - dev_gamma);
c = [beta_gamma_k (1:d) - maxdev_beta_k , ...
-beta_gamma_k (1:d), ...
epsilon - beta_gamma_k(d+1:end), ...
sum(beta_gamma_k(d+1:end)) - gamma , ...
-beta_gamma_k(d+1: end)];
ceq = [ ];
The following code is the code for R_constraint_no_reg.m, which gives the constraints for R
without regulation as tested in Section F.2.
function [c,ceq] = R_constraint_no_reg(beta_gamma_k ,epsilon ,gamma ,
sig0_k)
d = length(beta_gamma_k)/2;
c = [-beta_gamma_k (1:d), ...
epsilon - beta_gamma_k(d+1:end), ...
sum(beta_gamma_k(d+1:end)) - gamma , ...
-beta_gamma_k(d+1: end)];
ceq = [ ];
The following code is the code for run_test.m, which is used to gather data under the desired
hyperparameters in Section F.2.
function [min_R_val ,min_beta_gamma_k ,min_R_val_no_reg ,
min_beta_gamma_k_no_reg ,maxdev_beta_k] = ...
run_test(d,alpha ,epsilon ,sig0_k ,R_k ,cfac)
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options = optimoptions(@fmincon ,...
’Display ’,’off’,’Algorithm ’,’interior -point’);
gamma = alpha;
beta_init = rand(1,d);
gamma_init = R_k; gamma_init = gamma_init/sum(gamma_init);
init_vals = [beta_init ,gamma_init ];
min_R_val = 100000;
min_beta_gamma_k = nan;
min_R_val_no_reg = 100000;
min_beta_gamma_k_no_reg = nan;
[beta_gamma_k ,R_val] = ...
fmincon(@(beta_gamma_k)R_objfunx(beta_gamma_k ,sig0_k ,R_k ,cfac),
...
init_vals ,[],[],[],[],[],[], ...
@(beta_gamma_k)R_constraint(beta_gamma_k ,epsilon ,gamma ,
sig0_k), ...
options);
[beta_gamma_k_no_reg ,R_val_no_reg] = ...
fmincon(@(beta_gamma_k)R_objfunx(beta_gamma_k ,sig0_k ,R_k ,cfac),
...
init_vals ,[],[],[],[],[],[], ...
@(beta_gamma_k)R_constraint_no_reg(beta_gamma_k ,epsilon ,
gamma ,sig0_k), ...
options);
if (R_val < min_R_val)
min_R_val = R_val;
min_beta_gamma_k = beta_gamma_k;
min_R_val_no_reg = R_val_no_reg;
min_beta_gamma_k_no_reg = beta_gamma_k_no_reg;
end
Delta_eps = sig0_k .^2*( norminv (1 - epsilon /2)); % d x 1
dev_gamma = sig0_k .^2.* norminv (1 - min_beta_gamma_k(d+1:end)/2);
maxdev_beta_k = (Delta_eps - dev_gamma);
end
The following code is the code for plot_lin_result.m, which is used to plot Fig. F.1.
function f = plot_lin_result(N,noise_var ,x_spread_var ,betas ,config)
x1 = sqrt(x_spread_var)*randn(N,1);
beta_var = [noise_var/N, noise_var*inv(x1 ’*x1)];
f = figure(’Position ’ ,[400, 400, 450, 300]);
x_vals = -3:0.01:3;
y1 = betas (2)*x1 + sqrt(noise_var)*randn(N,1) + betas (1);
mdl = fitlm(x1 ,y1);
b_est0 = mdl.Coefficients {1,1};
b_est1 = mdl.Coefficients {2,1};
for i=1: config.M
beta0 = b_est0 + sqrt(beta_var (1))*randn (1,1);
beta1 = b_est1 + sqrt(beta_var (2))*randn (1,1);
p = plot(x_vals ,beta1*x_vals + beta0 ,’Color’,config.gray_clr);
p.Color (4) = config.alpha;
hold on
end
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plot(x_vals ,betas (2)*x_vals + betas (1),’k’, ...
’LineWidth ’ ,1);
plot(x1,y1,’.’,’MarkerSize ’,config.mkr_size ,’Color ’,config.green_clr)
hold off
xlabel(’x’)
ylabel(’y’)
set(findall(gcf ,’-property ’,’FontSize ’), ...
’FontSize ’,config.fnt_size)
xlim ([-3,3])
ylim ([-1,4])
saveas(f, sprintf(’data/LIN_N_%d_noisevar_ %.2 f_xspreadvar_ %.2 f_beta_
%.2 f_intercept_ %.2f.png’, ...
N, noise_var , x_spread_var , betas (2), betas (1)))
end
G.3 Jupyter notebook for Simulation 3 (Fig. 3)
The following is the Jupyter notebook used to generate Fig. 3
#!/usr/bin/env python
# coding: utf -8
# In[1]:
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import scipy.stats as ss
get_ipython ().run_line_magic(’matplotlib ’, ’inline ’)
plt.style.use(’seaborn ’)
# In[2]:
# Plotting constants/parameters
width = 8.5
resol = 0.01
x = np.arange(-width *0.65, width , resol)
figsizeset = (8,6)
figsizeset2 = (6,6)
axisfontsize = 24
legfontsize =18
lww = 2
alph = 1.0
markerfontsize = 24
# In[3]:
# Plotting one -dimensional normal distribution
def plot_normal(x_range , mu=0, sigma=1, cdf=False , fill=False , **
kwargs):
x = x_range
if cdf:
y = ss.norm.cdf(x, mu , sigma)
else:
y = ss.norm.pdf(x, mu , sigma)
if (not fill):
plt.plot(x, y, ** kwargs)
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else:
plt.fill_between(x, y, 0, facecolor=’grey’, alpha =0.1)
# In[4]:
# Reward function parameters
d_max = 2.5 # d_beta at which maximum reward occurs
slp = 1 # coefficient of reward function
weight = 0.25 # weight used in distance metric/function
def reward(d_mu , a=slp , d_cen=d_max):
return -a*(np.abs(d_mu - d_max) - d_max)
def cost(d_mu , a=slp , d_cen=d_max , inv=False):
if (inv):
cost = d_mu
d_mu = np.maximum(cost/a - d_max , d_max - cost/a)
return d_mu
rew = reward(d_mu , a=a, d_cen=d_cen)
cost = a*( d_max) - rew
return cost
def f(diversities , costs , r, sdNat):
poww = 2
variances = np.power(diversities ,poww)
d_mus = cost(costs ,inv=True)
dist_thresh = d_mus/np.power(variances ,0.5) + weight*np.maximum(0,
np.abs(variances - sdNat **poww) - r)
return dist_thresh
# In[5]:
# PARAMETERS
mus = [0, 1, 2.25, 2.25]
sds = [0.5, 1.25, 1.65, 0.5]
r1 = 0.25
muNat1 = 0
sdNat1 = 1.125
r2 = 1
muNat2 = 0
sdNat2 = 1.5
num_dists = len(mus)
colors = plt.cm.jet(np.linspace (0,1, num_dists))
colors = [’red’,’blue’,’green’,’orange ’,’purple ’]
mrks = [’s’,’X’,’*’,’^’,’D’]
mrk_sizes = [13 ,14 ,17 ,14 ,14]
# Level vals
level_vals = np.zeros(num_dists)
for i in range(0, num_dists):
level_vals[i] = f(sds[i], cost(mus[i]), r1 , sdNat1)
level_vals = np.concatenate (([0 ,0.05] , level_vals),axis =0)
level_vals = np.concatenate ((level_vals ,[10 ,20 ,1000]),axis =0)
level_vals_log = np.log(level_vals + 0.01)
# In[6]:
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# Plot first subfigure
fig , ax = plt.subplots(figsize=figsizeset)
plot_normal(x, muNat1 , sdNat1 , color=’black’, lw=lww , ls=’-’, fill=
True)
plot_normal(x, muNat1 , sdNat1 , color=’black’, marker=’o’, markevery
=275, markersize=mrk_sizes [0]-4, lw=lww , ls=’-’, alpha =0.5,
label=r’$N_1$ (control)’)
plot_normal(x, muNat2 , sdNat2 , color=’purple ’, lw=lww , ls=’-’, fill=
True)
plot_normal(x, muNat2 , sdNat2 , color=’purple ’, marker=’D’, markevery
=275, markersize=mrk_sizes [0]-4, lw=lww , ls=’-’, alpha =0.7,
label=r’$N_2$ (large FS)’)
for i in range(0, num_dists):
plot_normal(x, mus[i], sds[i], color=colors[i], lw=lww , ls=’-’,
alpha=alph , label=r’$F$ option #%s’ % str(i+1), marker
=mrks[i], markevery =275, markersize=mrk_sizes[i]-4)
ax.grid(False)
ax.set_xticks ([])
ax.set_yticks ([])
ax.set_xlabel(r’$\tilde {\beta}$’,fontsize=axisfontsize)
ax.set_ylabel(’probability density ’,fontsize=axisfontsize)
ax.set_facecolor(’white ’)
ax.legend(fontsize=legfontsize ,loc="upper right")
ax.text (.19 ,.79,r’$y_i ^{(t)} = \beta ^{(t)} + u_i^{(t)}$’ + ’\n’ + r’
$u_i ^{(t)} \sim \mathcal{N}\left (0,(\rho ^{(t)})^2 \right)$’,
horizontalalignment=’center ’,
transform=ax.transAxes ,
fontsize=legfontsize)
ax.tick_params(direction=’out’, length=8, width=1, colors=’black ’, pad
=4)
fig.savefig(’gaussian_plots.pdf’, transparent=True , dpi=300,
bbox_inches=’tight ’)
plt.show()
# In[7]:
# Plotting colormap
def plot_dists_on_grid(fig ,ax,sdNatTmp ,rTmp ,colorbar=False ,figsize=
figsizeset2):
fig , ax = plt.subplots(figsize=figsize)
for i in range(0, num_dists):
plt.plot(sds[i] , cost(mus[i]), mrks[i] ,markersize=mrk_sizes[
i], color=colors[i])
ax.annotate(’ %s’ % str(i+1), (sds[i] , cost(mus[i])),
fontsize=markerfontsize)
ax.set_xticks ([])
ax.set_yticks ([])
ax.set_xlim ([0.001 ,2.5])
ax.set_ylim ([ -0.5 ,3])
ax.set_xlabel(r’diversity ’, fontsize=axisfontsize)
ax.set_ylabel(’cost’, fontsize=axisfontsize)
# Gradient background
xpadding = 0.5
ypadding = 1
stddevs = np.linspace (0.001 , 2.5, 50)
costs = np.linspace (-0.5, 3, 50)
X, Y = np.meshgrid(stddevs , costs)
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Z = np.log(f(X, Y, rTmp , sdNatTmp)+0.01)
plt.contourf(X, Y, Z, levels=level_vals_log , cmap=’viridis ’,alpha
=0.5)
if (colorbar):
cbar = plt.colorbar(ticks=[-4, 5.8]);
cbar.ax.get_yaxis ().labelpad = -25
cbar.ax.set_yticklabels ([’ Strict ’,
’ Loose ’], fontsize =18)
cbar.ax.get_yaxis ().labelpad = -35
cbar.ax.set_ylabel(’strictness of regulation ’, rotation =270,
fontsize =18)
ax.text (.8,.05, ’low cost ,\nhigh diversity ’,
style=’italic ’,
horizontalalignment=’center ’,
transform=ax.transAxes ,
fontsize =18)
return fig , ax
# Plot second subfigure
fig , ax = plot_dists_on_grid(fig ,ax,sdNat1 ,r1)
plt.plot(sdNat1 , cost(muNat1), ’o’, color=’black ’, alpha =0.75,
markersize=mrk_sizes [0])
ax.annotate(r’ $N_1$ ’, (sdNat1 , cost(muNat1)), fontsize=
markerfontsize)
fig.savefig(’cost_v_diversity_t1.pdf’, transparent=True , dpi=300,
bbox_inches=’tight ’)
plt.show()
# In[8]:
# Plot third subfigure
fig , ax = plot_dists_on_grid(fig ,ax,sdNat2 ,r2,colorbar=True ,figsize=
figsizeset)
plt.plot(sdNat2 , cost(muNat2), ’D’, color=’purple ’, alpha =0.75,
markersize=mrk_sizes [0])
ax.annotate(r’ $N_2$ ’, (sdNat2 , cost(muNat2)), fontsize=
markerfontsize)
fig.savefig(’cost_v_diversity_t2_quickly_changing_world_diverse_N.pdf’
, transparent=True , dpi=300, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.show()
55
